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NO LONGER SECRET: OVERCOMING 
THE STATE SECRETS DOCTRINE TO 
EXPLORE MEANINGFUL REMEDIES 
FOR VICTIMS OF EXTRAORDINARY 
RENDITION 
“If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds 
contempt for the law . . . .”1 
Many, if not all, Americans would likely agree that state-
sponsored torture is wrong. The very notion of state-sponsored torture 
brings to mind countless atrocities committed during the Twentieth 
Century. On the other hand, many Americans would equally agree 
that the United States, in its national security interests, should use all 
means necessary to discover terrorist plots and uncover the 
whereabouts of wanted terrorists. To suggest that the United States 
itself would engage in questionable methods of interrogation2 that 
would rise to the level of state-sponsored torture in its fight against 
terrorism would almost certainly elicit reactions of denial, disgust, 
anger, and disbelief. Such techniques, however, lie at the heart of the 
government’s use of extraordinary rendition.  
Extraordinary rendition is a controversial program that the 
executive branch, particularly the Central Intelligence Agency, has 
allegedly used in its ongoing campaign against post-September 11 
                                                                                                                 
1
 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  
2
 See generally AMNESTY INT’L, ‘RENDITION’ AND SECRET DETENTION: A GLOBAL 
SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS—QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (Jan. 2006), available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/POL30/003/2006/en/db1dbfd1-d468-11dd-8743-
d305bea2b2c7/pol300032006en.pdf (discussing the issue of extraordinary rendition, its practice 
by the United States and other countries, and the legality of secret detention); HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, GHOST PRISONER: TWO YEARS IN SECRET CIA DETENTION 6–25 (Feb. 27, 2007), 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0207webwcover.pdf (describing in detail the 
secret detention of Marwan Jabour, a Palestinian former detainee who was held and mistreated 
in a secret CIA detention facility). 
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terrorist plots. It involves the detention, both domestically and abroad, 
of individuals who are suspected of having information about Al-
Qaeda and other terrorist groups. After the government detains these 
suspects, it then allegedly sends these individuals to secret U.S. 
detention facilities abroad, or foreign prisons. American or foreign 
officials then subject these suspects to harsh interrogation techniques 
that arguably rise to the level of torture.3  
Victims of extraordinary rendition have attempted to sue U.S. 
officials for damages based on abuses that they sustained either 
directly at the hands of U.S. officials4 or at the hands of foreign 
governments acting in collaboration with the United States.5 
Generally, they have brought their claims either as a Bivens action6 or 
under the Torture Victim Protection Act.7 These plaintiffs have 
encountered various obstacles to their claims in the federal courts, 
which have either refused to extend a Bivens action to the context of 
extraordinary rendition or dismissed their cases based on the “state 
secrets doctrine.”8 The result is that the federal courts have essentially 
created a class of victims of harsh interrogation techniques, arguably 
rising to the level of torture, for which relief is not currently available 
in the federal judicial system.  
This Note explores the implications of how the federal courts have 
treated claims by victims of extraordinary rendition. Part I articulates 
an overview of the definitions and legal principles underlying the 
practice of extraordinary rendition, with particular emphasis on how it 
has changed since September 11, 2001. Part II addresses current 
“remedies” available to victims: the Convention Against Torture, the 
Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act, the Torture Victim 
Protection Act, and the Bivens claim. Part III examines the state 
secrets doctrine, the most significant obstacle to plaintiffs bringing a 
                                                                                                                 
3
 See, e.g., Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends 
Interrogations, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2002, at A1 (discussing alleged abuses by U.S. officials 
in interrogations of terrorism suspects); see also infra Part IV (describing the treatment of 
Maher Arar, Binyam Mohamed, and other terrorist suspects).  
4
 See, e.g., El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 300–01 (4th Cir. 2007) (dismissing 
plaintiff’s lawsuit against the former director of the CIA for abuses he sustained while detained 
at a CIA facility in Afghanistan).  
5
 See, e.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 563–64 (2d Cir. 2009) (dismissing plaintiff’s 
case against U.S. officials for his treatment, allegedly authorized by the United States, at the 
hands of the Syrian government).  
6
 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 
388 (1971) (permitting a victim of a Fourth Amendment violation by federal officers to bring 
suit for money damages against the officers in federal court); see also infra Part II.B.2 
(explaining the Bivens cause of action).  
7
 Pub. L. No. 102–256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).  
8
 See infra Parts III.A–B (discussing the Totten Bar and the Reynolds privilege which, 
collectively, are the guiding principles of the state secrets doctrine). 
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cause of action under one of the aforementioned theories. Part IV then 
discusses two recent extraordinary rendition cases in which plaintiffs’ 
cases were dismissed: Arar v. Ashcroft9 and Mohamed v. Jeppesen 
Dataplan, Inc.10 Finally, Part V completes the analysis of this Note 
by: (1) offering a re-evaluation of current remedies that federal courts 
have wrongly applied; (2) examining two precedents where victims of 
state abuse received compensation through a formal commission of 
inquiry: the compensation of Maher Arar by the Canadian 
government and the compensation of Japanese Americans interned 
during the Second World War by the American government; and (3) 
proposing that Congress establish a commission of inquiry into the 
extraordinary rendition program in light of the limitations of judicial 
relief to victims of extraordinary rendition reinforced by the holdings 
of Arar and Jeppesen. 
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES BEHIND 
EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION 
A. Evolution of the Doctrine of Extraordinary Rendition 
One of the challenges of approaching the subject of extraordinary 
rendition is the confusion that the term creates in modern parlance. 
Indeed, the term “extraordinary rendition” is different from the 
traditional definition of “rendition,” which is “[t]he return of a 
fugitive from one state to the state where the fugitive is accused or 
was convicted of a crime.”11 Margaret Satterthwaite incorporates this 
baseline definition when she defines “extraordinary rendition” as “the 
transfer of an individual, without the benefit of a legal proceeding in 
which the individual can challenge the transfer, to a country where he 
or she is at risk of torture.”12 This would seem to imply that, at the 
very least, the removal of a person by the government of one country 
                                                                                                                 
9
 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009). 
10
 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011) (mem.).  
11
 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1410 (9th ed. 2009). 
12
 Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendition and the 
Rule of Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1333, 1336 (2007); see also Louis Fisher, Extraordinary 
Rendition: The Price of Secrecy, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1405, 1406 (2008) (critiquing that under the 
doctrine of extraordinary rendition, “the President claims to possess inherent authority to seize 
individuals and transfer them to other countries for interrogation and torture”). Fisher and other 
legal commentators maintain that the practical application of executive authorization of 
extraordinary rendition, particularly in the post-September 11 context, involves sending 
potential terrorism suspects to countries in which they will be tortured. While this author shares 
those views, one should acknowledge that President Bush maintained that “[t]he United States 
does not torture. It’s against our laws, and it’s against our values. I have not authorized it, and I 
will not authorize it.” See Remarks on the War on Terror, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1569, 
1573 (Sep. 6, 2006) (discussing the U.S. policy regarding torture). 
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to another country involves a definite legal process, ordinarily 
requiring explicit congressional authorization.13 As the American 
legal system developed and foreign relations evolved, Attorneys 
General took the position that “extradition and rendition require 
congressional action by statutes or treaties.”14 They reiterated time 
and again that without the express authorization by Congress or 
treaty, the President had no inherent power to render foreign nationals 
to another country.15 Subsequent “[a]dministrations that did depart 
from those principles paid a political price.”16 
The idea that the President needs authorization from Congress or a 
treaty in order to render someone in U.S. custody to another country 
began to change during the Clinton administration. In 1995, President 
Clinton signed Presidential Directive 39, authorizing the Secretary of 
State and the Attorney General to “use all legal means available to 
exclude from the United States persons who pose a terrorist threat and 
deport or otherwise remove from the United States any such aliens.”17 
Then, in 1998, terrorist organizations working in collaboration with 
Osama bin Laden bombed the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and 
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.18 In response, the Clinton administration 
“pioneered the use of extraordinary rendition . . . [although the 
                                                                                                                 
13
 For much of the history of the United States, the legal process of rendition of fugitives 
required a bilateral treaty between the United States and a foreign nation. Secretaries of State 
and Attorneys General were reluctant to approve the unilateral authority of the President to 
render fugitives to a foreign country absent an explicit Congressional authorization through a 
bilateral treaty. See Fisher, supra note 12, at 1407–1412 (providing a general overview and 
illustrative examples of the history and rationale for limitations on executive power to render a 
fugitive to a foreign country absent a treaty or explicit congressional authorization); see also 
Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 9 (1936): 
There is no executive discretion to surrender [a fugitive] to a foreign government 
unless that discretion is granted by law. It necessarily follows that as the legal 
authority does not exist save as it is given by act of Congress or by the terms of a 
treaty, it is not enough that statute or treaty does not deny the power to surrender. It 
must be found that statute or treaty confers the power. 
14
 Fisher, supra note 12, at 1408.  
15
 See id. at 1408–09 (detailing the actions of Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson and 
Attorneys General Charles Lee, William Wirt, and Roger Taney and their determinations, in 
demands by France, Spain, and Portugal for the United States to turn over fugitives present in 
the United States and wanted in those countries, that the President lacked the authority to render 
the fugitives without congressional authority or a bilateral treaty).  
16
 See id. at 1411 (discussing the political outcry that President Lincoln received after he, 
without the authority of Congress or a treaty with Spain, ordered a Spanish subject to be seized 
during the Civil War and returned to Cuba for trial).  
17
 Presidential Decision Directive 39: U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism 2 (Jun. 21, 1995), 
available at http://www.hsdl.org/?view&doc=62741&coll=limited (login required). 
18
 See, e.g., James C. McKinley, Jr., Kenya and Tanzania Attacks Are Nearly 
Simultaneous, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1998, at A1 (reporting on the nearly simultaneous bombings 
outside the U.S. embassies in the Kenyan and Tanzanian capitals, and the belief that Osama bin 
Laden was responsible for coordinating the attacks).  
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administration] also pressed allied intelligence services to respect 
lawful boundaries in interrogations.”19 In this way, extraordinary 
rendition became a power directly and independently claimed by the 
executive branch.  
B. Extraordinary Rendition and Practices After September 11, 2001 
“We don’t kick the [expletive] out of them. We send them to 
other countries so they can kick the [expletive] out of 
them.”20 
The government’s approach to extraordinary renditions changed in 
the wake of September 11 and the initiation of the George W. Bush 
administration’s “war on terror.” Given the classified nature of the 
information surrounding extraordinary renditions, it is difficult to 
know precisely how many suspected terrorists that the government 
has processed throughout the course of its extraordinary rendition 
program. In 2002, however, Dana Priest and Barton Gellman wrote 
one of the first investigative stories for the Washington Post about the 
extraordinary rendition program. Their article reported: 
According to U.S. officials, nearly 3,000 suspected al Qaeda 
members and their supporters have been detained worldwide 
since Sept. 11, 2001. About 625 are at the U.S. military’s 
confinement facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Some 
officials estimated that fewer than 100 captives have been 
rendered to third countries. Thousands have been arrested and 
held with U.S. assistance in countries known for brutal 
treatment of prisoners, the officials said.21 
Likewise, other than firsthand accounts from victims who have 
brought claims in federal court for abuses they experienced as a result 
of the government targeting them in its extraordinary rendition 
program, little verifiable, unclassified evidence exists with respect to 
detention and interrogation tactics. As one official has reported, “‘ 
                                                                                                                 
19
 Priest & Gellman, supra note 3; see also U.S Counter-Terrorism Policy: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 33 (1998) (statement of Louis J. Freeh, 
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation) (“[PDD 77] sets explicit requirements for initiating 
[the return of] terrorists to stand trial in the United States.”). But see Presidential Decision 
Directive 39, supra note 17, at 4 (“If we do not receive adequate cooperation from a state that 
harbors a terrorist whose extradition we are seeking, we shall take appropriate measures to 
induce cooperation. Return of suspects by force may be effected without the cooperation of the 
host government . . . .”).  
20
 Priest & Gellman, supra note 3 (emphasis omitted) (quoting an anonymous official 
involved in the United States’ extraordinary rendition program). 
21
 Id. 
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[t]his is a very highly classified area. . . . There was a before 9/11, and 
there was an after 9/11. . . . After 9/11 the gloves [came] off. ’”22 
Unlike Guantanamo Bay, “the CIA’s overseas interrogation facilities 
are off-limits to outsiders, and often even to other government 
agencies . . . [and the CIA] often uses the facilities of foreign 
intelligence services.”23  
The election of President Barack Obama in 2008 did not bring an 
end to the extraordinary rendition program, although the Obama 
Administration indicated that practices of interrogating terrorist 
suspects would be in full compliance with domestic and international 
law.24 On his second day in office, President Obama signed an 
executive order purporting to ensure the lawful interrogation of 
terrorist suspects.25 The executive order, entitled Ensuring Lawful 
Interrogations, expressly limited interrogation techniques to those 
listed in the Army Field Manual, emphasized the humane treatment of 
detainees, and ordered the closure of CIA detention facilities.26 This 
“humane approach” to the extraordinary rendition program appears 
on the surface to help the United States meet its obligations under 
international law; however, the executive order has only solidified 
extraordinary rendition as an institution of the executive branch.  
II. CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR VICTIMS OF 
EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION 
The developing doctrine of extraordinary rendition consolidates 
executive power to detain, remove, and interrogate terrorist suspects. 
Juxtaposed against this is a legal framework recognizing the need to 
protect and compensate victims of torture or abuse by the state or its 
agents. The United States is a party to international conventions 
prohibiting the use of torture and provides statutory remedies to 
torture victims.27 Additionally, the Supreme Court of the United 
States has recognized the need to provide judicial remedies to victims 
                                                                                                                 
22
 Id. (citing the description of Cofer Black, former head of the CIA Counterterrorist 
Center, who spoke about the agency’s “new forms of ‘operational flexibility’”).  
23
 Id. 
24
 See David Johnston, Rendition to Continue, but with Better Oversight, U.S. Says, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 25, 2009, at A8 (reporting that the extraordinary rendition process begun under 
President Clinton and expanded under President George W. Bush would continue, but with 
closer scrutiny to ensure that interrogations were lawful and did not use physical force).  
25
 Exec. Order No. 13,491, 3 C.F.R. 199 (2009).  
26
 Id. at 200–02. 
27
 See Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–256, § 2, 106 Stat. 73 
(1992) reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (establishing a cause of action for individuals 
subjected to torture to bring against their assailants); see also infra Part II.B.1 (discussing the 
Torture Victim Prevention Act). 
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of abuse by public officials.28 Victims of extraordinary rendition have 
attempted to seek redress in the federal courts within these existing 
legal frameworks. 
A. Laws Prohibiting Torture  
1. Convention Against Torture 
In 1988, the United States became a signatory to the United 
Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment.29 Article 1 of the Convention 
defines torture as: 
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical 
or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such 
purposes as obtaining from him [sic] or a third person 
information or a confession, punishing him [sic] for an act he 
[sic] or a third person has committed or is suspected of 
having committed . . . when such pain or suffering is inflicted 
by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence 
of a public official or other person acting in an official 
capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only 
from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.30 
Of particular relevance in the context of extraordinary rendition is 
Article 3 of the Convention: 
No State Party shall expel, return . . . or extradite a person to 
another state where there are substantial grounds for 
believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to 
torture. For the purpose of determining whether there are 
substantial grounds, the competent authorities shall take into 
account all relevant considerations including, where 
applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a 
consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of 
human rights.31 
                                                                                                                 
28
 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 
388 (1971) (holding that a petitioner whose claim “states a cause under the Fourth 
Amendment . . . is entitled to recover money damages for any injuries he has suffered as a 
result . . . ”); see also infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the Bivens remedy which individuals can seek 
against the government for engaging in the practice of torture). 
29
 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention Against Torture or 
Convention].  
30
 Convention Against Torture, 1465 U.N.T.S. 113–14, art. 1.  
31
 Convention Against Torture, 1465 U.N.T.S., art. 3.  
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President Reagan signed the Convention Against Torture on April 
18, 1988, and the Convention was ratified by the Senate on October 
27, 1990, subject to certain declarations, reservations, and 
understandings.32 According to the United States’ understanding of 
the Convention, in order to “acquiesce to an act of torture, that 
official must, ‘prior to the activity constituting torture, have 
awareness of such activity and thereafter breach his or her . . . legal 
responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity.’”33 
2. The Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 
In light of the Senate’s determination that the Convention Against 
Torture was not self-executing, in 1998 Congress enacted the Foreign 
Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act [FARR Act].34 The FARR Act 
provides in pertinent part: 
It shall be the policy of the United States not to expel, 
extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any 
person to a country in which there are substantial grounds for 
believing the person would be in danger of being subject to 
torture, regardless of whether the person is physically present 
in the United States.35  
The FARR Act also directs appropriate agencies to “prescribe 
regulations to implement the obligations of the United States under 
Article 3 [of the Convention Against Torture].”36 
In this way, the FARR Act was designed to allow the United States 
to meet its obligations under the Convention Against Torture by 
prohibiting the removal of a person to a foreign country where he or 
she would be tortured. The application of the FARR Act, however, is 
not without its jurisdictional limitations. Indeed, Congress limited the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts to hear a claim under the FARR Act 
in section 2242(d), which states: 
                                                                                                                 
32
 See Message to the Senate Transmitting the Convention Against Torture and Inhuman 
Treatment or Punishment, 1 PUB. PAPERS 623 (May 20, 1988) (asking the Senate to ratify the 
CAT and explaining that it was signed with reservations, understandings and declarations); see 
also MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32438, U.N. CONVENTION AGAINST 
TORTURE (CAT): OVERVIEW AND APPLICATION TO INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES 5–6 (2008) 
(explaining that one of the most significant declarations regarding the Senate’s ratification of the 
Convention was that that Articles 1 through 16 were not self-executing, meaning that in order to 
fulfill its obligations under the Convention, the United States had to pass implementing 
legislation in order to give the Convention domestic force of law).  
33
 GARCIA, supra note 32, at 6–7 (quoting SEN. EXEC. DOC. NO. 101–30, 9 (1990)).  
34
 Pub. L. No. 105–277, § 1001, 112 Stat. 2681–761 (1998) reprinted in 8 U.S.C. 1231. 
35
 Id. § 2242 (a), 112 Stat. 2681–822 (emphasis added).  
36
 Id. § 2242 (b).  
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[N]o court shall have jurisdiction to review the regulations 
adopted to implement this section, and nothing in this section 
shall be construed as providing any court jurisdiction to 
consider or review claims raised under the Convention or this 
section, or any other determination . . . except as part of the 
review of a final order of removal pursuant to Section 242 of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act.37 
In 2007, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit applied 
the Convention Against Torture, through the FARR Act, to the case 
of Petru Mironescu, a Romanian national wanted in Romania for 
various charges of automobile theft.38 In that case, the government 
appealed a district court order denying its motion to dismiss 
Mironescu’s habeas corpus petition. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit 
dismissed Mironescu’s petition and noted that the FARR Act 
explicitly provided jurisdiction to review claims under the 
Convention Against Torture only in the context of immigration 
removal proceedings.39  
B. Current Remedies for Victims of Torture 
1. The Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 
Article 14 of the Convention Against Torture requires the 
signatory parties to the Convention to ensure that victims of torture 
have a means through which they can obtain redress and 
compensation.40 In response, and in order to carry out the obligations 
of the United States under the Convention, Congress enacted the 
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 [TVPA].41 The TVPA 
                                                                                                                 
37
 Id. § 2242(d).  
38
 See Mironescu v. Costner, 480 F.3d 664, 667 (4th Cir. 2007).  
39
 Id. at 674 (“[The FARR Act] plainly conveys that although courts may consider or 
review CAT or FARR Act claims as part of their review of a final removal order, they are 
otherwise precluded from considering or reviewing such claims. As Mironescu presents his 
claims as part of his challenge to extradition, rather than removal, § 2242(d) [of the FARR Act] 
clearly precluded the district court from exercising jurisdiction.”).  
40
 See Convention Against Torture, supra note 29, at art. 14 (“Each State Party shall 
ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress and has an 
enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation, including the means for as full 
rehabilitation as possible.”).  
41
 Pub. L. No. 102–256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) 
[hereinafter TVPA]; see also H.R. REP. NO. 102–367, at 85–86 (1991): 
One such obligation [under the Convention Against Torture] is to provide means of 
civil redress to victims of torture. . . . The general collapse of democratic institutions 
characteristic of countries scourged by massive violations of fundamental rights 
rarely leaves the judiciary intact. The Torture Victim Protection Act [TVPA] . . . 
would response [sic] to this situation. 
158
1246 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:4 
provides that “[a]n individual who, under actual or apparent authority, 
or color of law, of any foreign nation . . . subjects an individual to 
torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that 
individual.”42 The TVPA also requires the federal courts to dismiss a 
claim under the Act if the claimant “has not exhausted adequate and 
available remedies in the place in which the conduct giving rise to the 
claim occurred”43 and imposes a ten-year statute of limitations on all 
claims.44 Unlike the Alien Tort Claims Act,45 the TVPA is not in itself 
a jurisdictional statute.46  
As discussed above, the TVPA provides in part that an individual 
is liable for money damages for subjecting another individual to 
torture while acting “under actual or apparent authority.”47 The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has been particularly 
willing to uphold this agency theory of liability based on direct and 
indirect liability.48 The Eleventh Circuit has based its application of 
direct and indirect liability to the TVPA on earlier, similar holdings in 
the Ninth and Fifth Circuits.49 
                                                                                                                 
42
 TVPA § 2(a)(1).  
43
 Id. § 2(b). 
44
 Id. § 2(c).  
45
 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any 
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of 
the United States.”). 
46
 See Kadic v. Karadži , 70 F.3d 232, 246 (2d Cir. 1995) (“The Torture Victim Act 
permits the appellants to pursue their claims of official torture under the jurisdiction conferred 
by the Alien Tort Act and also under the general federal question jurisdiction of section 
1331 . . . .”).  
47
 TVPA § 2(a).  
48
 See, e.g., Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, 416 F.3d 1242, 1265 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(sustaining a TVPA claim where plaintiffs alleged that U.S. corporation “hire[d] and direct[ed]” 
its employees and/or agents including a Guatemalan mayor, “to torture the plaintiffs and 
threaten them with death . . . .”); see also Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315–16 
(11th Cir. 2008) (upholding theory of aiding and abetting liability under the Alien Tort Claims 
Act and the TVPA); Cabello v. Fernández-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148, 1158 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(upholding suit by survivors of Chilean official who was killed during Pinochet regime against a 
former Chilean military officer on the basis that “the TVPA and the ATCA permit claims based 
on direct and indirect theories of liability . . .”).  
49
 See Romero, 552 F.3d at 1315 (“We based our decision in Cabello on the text of the 
statutes [and] the decisions of two sister circuits [the 9th and the 5th Circuits].”); see also Hilao 
v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 776–777 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the former president of 
the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos, could be held liable for human rights abuses if proved that 
he knew of abuses by military and paramilitary forces under his command and failed to prevent 
it); Carmichael v. United Tech. Corp., 835 F.2d 109, 113–14 (5th Cir. 1988) (assuming, though 
not fully deciding, that the Alien Tort Claims Act “does confer subject matter jurisdiction over 
private parties who conspire in, or aid and abet, official acts of torture by one nation against the 
citizens of another nation.”).  
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2. Remedies for Victims of Abuse by Public Official: The Bivens 
Action 
Another cause of action that has surfaced in suits against the 
government for extraordinary rendition is the Bivens remedy, named 
after a 1971 Supreme Court case, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics.50 While specific Bivens 
remedy claims in the context of extraordinary rendition are addressed 
below,51 this Section is an introduction to the principle behind the 
Bivens remedy: compensation for constitutional violations by federal 
officials. The primary allegation in Bivens was that agents of the 
Federal Bureau of Narcotics entered the plaintiff’s home without a 
warrant, arrested him, and treated him roughly in front of his wife and 
children.52 The Court held that the agents had violated Bivens’s rights 
under the Fourth Amendment53 and that he was entitled to recover 
money damages.54 The “purpose of the Bivens remedy ‘is to deter 
individual federal officers from committing constitutional 
violations.’”55 Since 1971, the Bivens remedy has been expanded 
outside of the Fourth Amendment search and seizure context only 
twice: (1) employment discrimination in violation of the Due Process 
Clause56 and (2) Eighth Amendment57 violations by prison officials.58 
                                                                                                                 
50
 403 U.S. 368 (1971).  
51
 See infra Part IV (analyzing two cases in which the courts declined to extend a Bivens 
remedy to victims of extraordinary rendition).  
52
 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389–90 (detailing Bivens’ complaint that the search was conducted 
without a warrant and the he suffered “great humiliation, embarrassment, and mental suffering 
as a result of the agents’ unlawful conduct . . . .”).  
53
 U.S. Const. amend. IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
54
 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397 (“Having concluded that petitioner’s complain states a cause of 
action under the Fourth Amendment . . . we hold that petitioner is entitled to recover money 
damages for any injuries he has suffered as a result of the agents’ violation of the 
Amendment.”).  
55
 Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 571 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Corr. Servs. Corp. v. 
Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70 (2001)).  
56
 See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248–49 (1979) (extending the Bivens cause of 
action for damages arising under a violation of Fourth Amendment rights to a cause and action 
and damages remedy to a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).  
57
 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).  
58
 See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19 (1980) (extending a Bivens remedy to the context 
of a prisoner who suffered personal injuries while in the custody of federal prison officials).  
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III. THE STATE SECRETS DOCTRINE AND ITS BARRIERS TO 
EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION CLAIMS  
A recurring theme arising in extraordinary rendition claims is that 
the plaintiff’s suit cannot continue without relying on or revealing 
certain information that would compromise sensitive military and 
foreign policy information. While Part IV addresses this issue in the 
specific context of recent decisions regarding extraordinary rendition 
suits, this Section discusses the legal framework of the state secrets 
doctrine and focuses on two co-principles of the doctrine: the Totten 
bar and the Reynolds privilege.  
A. The Totten Bar 
The first principle that governs the state secrets doctrine is the 
Totten bar, which completely bars adjudication of claims premised on 
state secrets. The name is derived from a Civil War era Supreme 
Court case, Totten v. United States.59 That case involved an action by 
the estate of a Union spy, contracted during the Civil War to infiltrate 
Confederate territory, to recover compensation for services rendered 
during the war.60 The Court based its dismissal of the claim on the 
principle that “public policy forbids the maintenance of any suit in a 
court of justice, the trial of which would inevitably lead to the 
disclosure of matters which the law itself regards as confidential, and 
respecting which it will not allow the confidence to be violated.”61 
The Court added that “[m]uch greater reason exists for the principle 
[of barring a suit premised on confidential information] to cases of 
contract for secret services with the government, as the existence of a 
contract of that kind is itself a fact not to be disclosed.”62  
The Supreme Court has since affirmed its holding in Totten in 
more recent lawsuits: one brought by an environmental group seeking 
to compel the Navy to release environmental impact statements 
regarding alleged storage of nuclear weapons in Hawaii,63 and another 
petitioning the federal government to provide promised compensation 
                                                                                                                 
59
 92 U.S. 105 (1875).  
60
 Id. at 106–07 (holding that the action could not be maintained in the Court of Claims 
for damages arising from a contract for secret services during the Civil War between President 
Lincoln and the spy).  
61
 Id. at 107.  
62
 Id.  
63
 See Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw./Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139, 141 
(1981) (holding that unless the Navy openly stored nuclear weapons at the site in dispute, the 
judiciary could not force the Navy to release an environmental impact statement under the 
National Environmental Policy Act, since the “Navy’s regulations [forbade] it either to admit or 
deny that nuclear weapons [were] actually stored [at the naval base].”). 
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to foreign nationals who allegedly performed espionage services for 
the United States during the Cold War.64 Thus, while the line of 
Totten cases would seem to limit its application to military and 
espionage contexts, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
has read Totten (as well as Reynolds, to which this discussion will 
presently turn) to “mean that the Totten bar applies to cases in which 
‘the very subject matter of the action’ is a matter of state secret.’”65 
B. The Reynolds Privilege 
The second principle governing the state secrets doctrine is the 
Reynolds privilege: an evidentiary privilege that the government may 
invoke when state secrets are involved to exclude any privileged 
evidence, which can result in a dismissal of the case. The Supreme 
Court first officially recognized the doctrine in United States v. 
Reynolds,66 which involved the crash of a military aircraft that was 
carrying secret electronic equipment, killing three civilian 
observers.67 The widows of the civilian observers filed actions against 
the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act68 and, under the 
discovery rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,69 asked the 
Air Force to produce its official accident investigation report.70   
The Supreme Court refused to require the Air Force to disclose the 
report and sustained the government’s claim of privilege on the 
theory that “there was a reasonable danger that the accident 
investigation report would contain references to the secret electronic 
equipment which was the primary concern of the mission.”71 The 
Court concluded that “[w]hen the Secretary of the Air Force lodged 
his formal ‘Claim of Privilege,’ he attempted therein to invoke the 
privilege against revealing military secrets, a privilege which is well 
established in the law of evidence.”72 
                                                                                                                 
64
 See Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 1–2 (2005) (reversing the decision of the lower court 
because that decision contravened “the longstanding rule, announced . . . in Totten, prohibiting 
suits against the Government based on covert espionage agreements.”).  
65
 Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1078 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied 
131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011) (mem.) (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 n.26 (1953)).  
66
 345 U.S. 1 (1953).  
67
 Id. at 3. 
68
 Pub. L. No. 79–753, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
28 U.S.C.).  
69
 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (outlining the general provisions and rules of discovery); FED. R. 
CIV. P. 34 (outlining the general provisions governing the requests and production of documents 
and tangible items).  
70
 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 2–3.  
71
 Id. at 10.  
72
 Id. at 6–7. 
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Subsequent case law has developed the Reynolds Privilege into a 
fuller test than the Supreme Court first established. The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit analyzed the Reynolds privilege under 
a three-step framework in El-Masri v. United States.73 Dismissing the 
case on the theory that it could compromise state secrets, the Fourth 
Circuit established a three-prong test to analyze a case under the 
Reynolds privilege. First, the court must ascertain that the procedural 
requirements for invoking the state secrets privilege have been 
satisfied; second, the court must decide whether the information 
sought to be protected qualifies as “privileged” under the state secrets 
doctrine; and third, the court must determine how the matter should 
proceed in light of a successful privilege claim.74 
Under the first prong of its test, the Fourth Circuit noted that the 
“privilege . . . ‘belongs to the Government and . . . can neither be 
claimed nor waived by a private party.’”75 Also important in the first 
prong of this test is the timing of the privilege assertion. In this 
respect, the court held that “dismissal at the pleading stage is 
appropriate if state secrets are so central to a proceeding that it cannot 
be litigated without threatening their disclosure.”76 
The second prong of the Fourth Circuit’s test is whether the 
information sought to be protected qualifies as privileged under the 
state secrets doctrine. The Fourth Circuit noted that “even the most 
compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the 
court is ultimately satisfied that [state] secrets are at stake.”77 Of 
particular importance in the analysis are matters of national security 
and foreign policy. Indeed, “[a] court is obliged to honor the 
Executive’s assertion of the privilege if it is satisfied, ‘from all the 
circumstances of the case, that there is a reasonable danger that 
compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters which, in the 
                                                                                                                 
73
 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007). The plaintiff in El-Masri was a German citizen of 
Lebanese descent who brought a Bivens action against the director of the CIA, George Tenet, 
and unknown CIA employees. The plaintiff alleged that he was unlawfully detained in 
Macedonia and removed to a CIA facility in Afghanistan, where he was mistreated by U.S. 
officials. Id. at 300.  
74
 See id. at 304, 306 (explaining the three steps in this test).  
75
 Id. (quoting Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7). The court, however, clarified who specifically 
may claim the privilege, and under what considerations that claim may be made. See id. 
(quoting Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 8) (determining that “‘there must be a formal claim of privilege, 
lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter’” and that such formal 
privilege claim “may be made only ‘after actual personal consideration by that officer.’”).  
76
 Id. at 308; see also Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F. 3d 1070, 1089 (9th Cir. 
2010), cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011) (mem.) (“[F]urther litigation presents an 
unacceptable risk of disclosure of state secrets no matter what legal or factual theories Jeppesen 
would choose to advance during a defense.”). 
77
 El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 305 (quoting Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
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interest of national security, should not be divulged.’”78 The court 
must review claims of privilege, however, “without forcing a 
disclosure of the very thing the privilege is designed to protect . . . . 
Too much judicial inquiry into the claim of privilege would force 
disclosure . . . while a complete abandonment of judicial control 
would lead to intolerable abuses.”79 
Finally, in the third prong of the Fourth Circuit’s test the court 
must decide how the matter should proceed in light of a successful 
privilege claim on behalf of the government. The court “must assess 
whether it is feasible for the litigation to proceed without the 
protected evidence and, if so, how.”80 What seems certain is that 
under this third prong there are “three circumstances where the 
Reynolds privilege would justify terminating a case.”81 The first is 
where “the plaintiff cannot prove the prima facie elements of [his or] 
her claim with nonprivileged evidence . . . .”82 In the second 
circumstance, “if the privilege deprives the defendant of information 
that would otherwise give the defendant a valid defense to the claim, 
then the court may grant summary judgment to the defendant.”83 In 
the third circumstance, however:  
[E]ven if the claims and defenses might theoretically be 
established without relying on privileged evidence, it may be 
                                                                                                                 
78
 El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 305 (quoting Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10); see also Al-Haramain 
Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1203 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e acknowledge the need 
to defer to the Executive on matters of foreign policy and national security and surely cannot 
legitimately find ourselves second guessing the Executive in this arena.”).  
The Fourth Circuit noted, however, that deference to the executive in matters of state 
secrets “does not represent a surrender of judicial control over access to the courts.” El-Masri, 
479 F.3d at 312; see also Al-Haramain, 507 F.3d at 1203 (“We take very seriously our 
obligation to review [documents that the government claims are protected by the privilege] with 
a very careful, indeed a skeptical, eye, and not to accept at face value the government’s claim or 
justification of privilege.”); Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that 
the role of the court must be “to ensure that the state secrets privilege is asserted no more 
frequently and sweepingly than necessary, [and as such] it is essential that the courts continue 
critically to examine instances of the invocation.”). 
79
 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 8.  
80
 Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1082 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied 
131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011) (mem.); see also Al-Haramain, 507 F.3d at 1204 (“The effect of the 
government's successful invocation of privilege ‘is simply that the evidence is unavailable, as 
though a witness had died, and the case will proceed accordingly, with no consequences save 
those resulting from the loss of evidence.’” (citing Ellsberg, 709 F.2d at 64)); Kasza v. Browner, 
133 F. 3d. 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that a successful invocation of the state secrets 
doctrine by the government means that “the evidence is completely removed from the case”).  
81
 Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1083. 
82
 Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1166. In such a case, the court would proceed with the dismissal as 
it would proceed with any plaintiff who failed to establish a prima facie case. See id (“[T]he 
court may dismiss [the] claim as it would with any plaintiff who cannot prove [his or] her 
case.”).  
83
 Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Bareford v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 973 F.2d 1138, 1141 
(5th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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impossible to proceed with the litigation because—privileged 
information being inseparable from nonprivileged 
information that will be necessary to the claims or defenses—
litigating the case to a judgment on the merits would present 
an unacceptable risk of disclosing state secrets.84 
In light of this “third” circumstance—dismissal of a case when the 
“very nature” of the case would reveal state secrets—the discussion 
now turns to examine two recent cases involving extraordinary 
rendition.  
IV. TWO RECENT CASE STUDIES: ARAR V. ASHCROFT AND MOHAMED 
V. JEPPESEN DATAPLAN, INC. 
The Second and Ninth Circuits have recently heard two suits for 
damages arising from mistreatment of non-citizens as part of the 
government’s extraordinary rendition program. Both cases are 
illustrative of the troubling legal problems surrounding extraordinary 
rendition because they provide firsthand accounts of what is 
otherwise a secretive program. They clearly show the deficiencies of 
the current legal frameworks within which victims of extraordinary 
rendition must operate, as well as the obstacles to relief that such 
victims must overcome in successfully proving their case.  
The first case, Arar v. Ashcroft,85 involved the treatment of Maher 
Arar, a dual Syrian and Canadian citizen who was detained in New 
York’s JFK Airport in 2002 while returning to Canada from a 
vacation in Tunisia.86 Arar was questioned “about his relationships 
with certain individuals who were suspected of terrorist ties,”87 placed 
in a detention center, found inadmissible to the United States for 
being a member of a terrorist organization88 and ordered removed to 
                                                                                                                 
84
 Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1083; see also In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139, 153 (D.C. Cir. 
2007) (“If the district court determines that the subject matter of a case is so sensitive that there 
is no way it can be litigated without risking national secrets, then the case must be dismissed.”); 
Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236, 1241–42 (4th Cir. 1985) (“[I]n some 
circumstances sensitive military secrets will be so central to the subject matter of the litigation 
that any attempt to proceed will threaten disclosure of the privileged matters.”). The case law 
seems to indicate, then, the courts’ willingness to dismiss a case if its prima facie claim is 
inextricably premised on—or is itself—a state secret.  
85
 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009).  
86
 Id. at 565.  
87
 Id. 
88
 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) (2006) (describing the grounds in which an alien is 
inadmissible to the United States based on membership in or support of a terrorist organization); 
see also id. § 1227(a)(1)(A) (“Any alien who at the time of entry . . . was within one or more of 
the classes of aliens inadmissible by the law existing at such time is deportable.”); id. § 1225(c): 
If an immigration officer or judge suspects that an arriving alien may be inadmissible 
under [provisions excluding certain aliens on national security grounds] . . . the 
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Syria.89 Prior to his removal, legacy Immigration and Naturalization 
Service90 “made a (required) finding that such removal would be 
consistent with Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture . . . .”91 
Arar spent a year in Syrian custody, and the conditions which he 
endured were nothing short of horrific: 
[Arar spent] the first ten months in an underground cell six 
feet by three, and seven feet high. He was interrogated for 
twelve days on his arrival in Syria, and in that period was 
beaten on his palms, hips, and lower back with a two-inch 
thick electric cable and with bare hands. Arar allege[d] that 
United States officials conspired to send him to Syria for the 
purpose of interrogation under torture, and directed the 
interrogations from abroad by providing Syria with Arar’s 
dossier, dictating questions for the Syrians to ask him, and 
receiving intelligence learned from the interviews.92  
Arar’s complaint sought damages from federal officials as a result 
of his detention in the United States and his removal to and detention 
in Syria.93 Specifically, Arar’s complaint sought “relief under the 
Torture Victim Protection Act . . . relief under the Fifth Amendment 
for [his] alleged torture in Syria . . . and his detention there . . . [and] 
relief under the Fifth Amendment for [his] detention in the United 
States prior to his removal to Syria.”94 
With respect to Arar’s cause of action under the TVPA, the 
Second Circuit, sitting en banc, held that Arar would need to 
“adequately allege that the [federal officials] possessed power under 
Syrian law, and that the offending actions . . . derived from an 
exercise of that power.”95 Finding no sufficient evidence that the 
                                                                                                                 
 
officer or judge shall (A) order the alien removed . . . (B) report the order of removal 
to the Attorney General; and (C) not conduct any further inquiry or hearing until 
ordered by the Attorney General. 
89
 Arar,585 F.3d at 565–66 .  
90
 Now Immigration and Customs Enforcement, part of the Department of Homeland 
Security.  
91
 Arar, 585 F.3d at 566; see also supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the Convention Against 
Torture).  
92
 Arar, 585 F.3d at 566. 
93
 Id. at 567. 
94
 Id.  
95
 Id. at 568; The court also noted that “[a]ny allegation arising under the TVPA requires a 
demonstration that the defendants acted under color of foreign law, or under its authority.” Id. 
(citing Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2nd. Cir. 1995).  
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federal officials acted under color of Syrian law, the court dismissed 
outright Arar’s TVPA claim.96   
Turning next to Arar’s petition for relief under the Fifth 
Amendment, the court analyzed Arar’s claim in the context of 
extending a Bivens remedy to cases involving extraordinary rendition. 
The court explained that, absent explicit action by Congress creating a 
cause of action, courts have been reluctant to extend a Bivens remedy 
to various situations when “special factors [counsel] hesitation,” such 
as, “military concerns, separation of powers, the comprehensiveness 
of available statutory schemes, national security concerns, and foreign 
policy considerations.”97 After weighing the various policy concerns 
in the case—namely, issues relating to national security and foreign 
relations—the court refused to extend a Bivens action to the context 
of extraordinary rendition because “such an action would have the 
natural tendency to affect diplomacy, foreign policy, and the security 
of the nation, and that fact counsels hesitation.”98 
In the second case, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc.,99 the 
Ninth Circuit allowed for a rehearing en banc of five plaintiffs, all 
foreign nationals, who alleged that the Central Intelligence Agency, 
“working in concert with other government agencies and officials of 
foreign governments, operated an extraordinary rendition program to 
gather intelligence by apprehending foreign nationals suspected of 
involvement in terrorist activities and transferring them in secret to 
foreign countries for detention and interrogation by United States or 
foreign officials.”100 This, according to plaintiffs, allowed the 
government to “employ interrogation methods that would [otherwise 
have been] prohibited under federal or international law.”101  
                                                                                                                 
96
 Id. at 568 (“At most, it is alleged that the defendants encouraged or solicited certain 
conduct by foreign officials. Such conduct is insufficient to establish that the defendants were in 
some way clothed with the authority of Syrian law or that their conduct may otherwise be fairly 
attributable to Syria.”).  
97
 Id. at 573 (citations omitted).  
98
 Id. at 574. The majority opinion, however, did not delineate what circumstances would 
make extension of a Bivens action to extraordinary rendition cases appropriate; rather, it stopped 
at the factors that would counsel “hesitation” by the judiciary of such an extension, holding that 
“Congress is the appropriate branch of government to decide under what circumstances (if any) 
these kinds of policy decisions—which are directly related to the security of the population and 
the foreign affairs of the country—should be subjected to the influence of litigation brought by 
aliens.” Id. at 580–81. 
99
 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011) (mem.).  
100
 Id. at 1073.  
101
 Id. (internal quotations marks omitted). The plaintiffs were all detained outside of the 
United States and none were, at least according to the facts presented in this case, permanent 
residents of the United States. The named plaintiff in this case, Binyam Mohamed, “an 
Ethiopian citizen and legal resident of the United Kingdom,” alleged that he “was arrested in 
Pakistan on immigration charges” and flown to Morocco, where he was subjected to physical 
and psychological torture by Moroccan security agents. He was then allegedly transferred back 
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The specific claim in this case was against not the government, but 
rather a U.S. corporation which provided “flight planning and 
logistical support services to the aircraft and crew on all of the flights 
transporting each of the five plaintiffs among the various locations 
where they were detained and allegedly subjected to torture.”102 The 
plaintiffs further alleged that Jeppesen “provided this assistance with 
actual or constructive ‘knowledge of the objectives of the rendition 
program,’ including knowledge that the plaintiffs ‘would be subjected 
to forced disappearance, detention, and torture’ by U.S. and foreign 
government officials.”103 
Analyzing the case in light of the state secrets doctrine,104 the court 
upheld the contention of the government that, under either the Totten 
bar or the Reynolds privilege, “[the] plaintiffs’ lawsuit should be 
dismissed . . .because ‘state secrets are so central to this case that 
permitting further proceeding[s] would create an intolerable risk of 
disclosure that would jeopardize national security.’”105 While the 
court acknowledged that “some of [the] plaintiffs’ claims might well 
fall within the Totten bar,”106 it placed particular emphasis on the 
Reynolds privilege as a justification for dismissing the plaintiffs’ case.  
Turning to the question of the Reynolds privilege, the court quickly 
disposed of the first step of the Reynolds analysis107—the procedural 
requirements—by determining that the government complied with the 
requirement by filing “General Hayden’s108 formal claim of privilege 
in his public declaration.”109 After reviewing the government’s public 
                                                                                                                 
 
to American custody and flown to Afghanistan where he was detained in a CIA “dark prison,” 
where he lost a considerable amount of weight. He was then transferred to the U.S. military 
prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where he remained for five years before being released and 
returned to the United Kingdom. Id. at 1074.  
102
 Id. at 1075. 
103
 Id.  
104
 See supra Part III (providing an overview of the state secrets doctrine, including its two 
corollaries: the Totten bar and the Reynolds privilege).  
105
 Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1083–84 (quoting Brief for United States at 13, Jeppesen, 614 
F.3d 1070 (No. 08–15693)).  
106
 Id. at 1084. The court ultimately concluded, however, that it could not “resolve the 
difficult question of precisely which claims may be barred under Totten because application of 
the Reynolds privilege leads us to conclude that this litigation cannot proceed further.” Id. at 
1085.  
107
 See supra Part III.B (providing an overview of the three steps of the Reynolds analysis).  
108
 General Michael V. Hayden (Air Force, Ret.) was director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency during the final two years of the Bush Administration. Before his departure in 2009, he 
defended the CIA’s interrogation techniques of terrorists. See Greg Miller, Departing CIA Chief 
Hayden Defends Interrogations, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2009, at A14 (reporting on Hayden’s 
tenure as CIA Director and his defense of controversial interrogation techniques used on 
terrorism suspects).  
109
 Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1085.  
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and classified declarations, the court was convinced that under the 
second part of the Reynolds analysis, “at least some of the matters 
[the government sought to protect were] . . . valid state secrets, 
‘which, in the interest of national security, should not be 
divulged.’”110 Finally the court held that “dismissal [was] . . . required 
under Reynolds because there [was] no feasible way to litigate 
Jeppesen’s alleged liability without creating an unjustifiable risk of 
divulging state secrets.”111 In dismissing the case, the court reasoned 
that “further litigation present[ed] an unacceptable risk of disclosure 
of state secrets no matter what legal or factual theories Jeppesen 
would choose to advance during a defense.”112 
V. REMEDIES FOR VICTIMS OF EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION: RE-
THINKING EXISTING DOCTRINES AND EXPLORING NEW SOLUTIONS 
The Second and Ninth Circuits dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims in 
both Arar v. Ashcroft and Mohamed v. Jeppesen. Where, then, does 
that leave victims of extraordinary rendition who bring future 
petitions for relief in the federal courts? Clearly, the holdings in both 
Arar and Jeppesen, coupled with the Supreme Court’s denial of 
certiorari in Arar,113 present significant challenges to further litigation 
in this area. The holdings in these cases, however, cannot and should 
not be the end of the discourse for victims of extraordinary rendition. 
This Section examines the shortcomings of the holdings reached by 
the majorities in Arar and Jeppesen, with particular emphasis on the 
dissents in both of those cases.114 It also analyzes potential remedies, 
                                                                                                                 
110
 Id. at 1086 (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953)). The government 
had asserted four categories of evidence that neither it nor Jeppesen should have been compelled 
to disclose:  
[1] information that would tend to confirm or deny whether Jeppesen or any other 
private entity assisted the CIA with clandestine intelligence activities; [2] 
information about whether any foreign government cooperated with the CIA in 
clandestine intelligence activities; [3] information about the scope or operation of the 
CIA terrorist detention and interrogation program; [or 4] any other information 
concerning CIA clandestine intelligence operations that would tend to reveal 
intelligence activities, sources, or methods. 
Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1086 (quoting Brief for United States, supra note 105, at 7–8).  
111
 Id. at 1087 (emphasis added).  
112
 Id. at 1089.  
113
 Arar v. Ashcroft, 130 S.Ct. 3409 (2010) (mem.). 
114
 For a more detailed analysis of both the Arar and Jeppesen cases and their impact on 
future litigation by victims of extraordinary rendition see Benjamin Bernstein, Comment, Over 
Before It Even Began: Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan and the Use of the State Secrets 
Privilege in Extraordinary Rendition Cases, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1400, 1426–1429 (2011) 
(arguing that although the majority’s expansion of the Reynolds privilege in Mohamed was 
incorrect, the alternatives proposed by the dissent are insufficient to provide victims with proper 
redress in the federal court system). 
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both judicial and non-judicial, the courts and Congress should 
consider. Past precedent115 seems to indicate that many years may 
pass before these proposed remedies become politically and 
practically viable. This should not, however, preclude considerations 
of how to produce fair compensation and redress to victims who have 
endured significant physical and emotional injuries as a result of their 
treatment at the hands of U.S. and foreign officials.  
A. Judicial Remedies 
1. The TVPA Should Be an Effective Remedy: Misapplication of 
“Color of Law” Requirement 
Under the Torture Victim Protection Act,116 “[a]n individual who, 
under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign 
nation . . . subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be 
liable for damages to that individual . . . .”117 As noted above, the 
majority in Arar v. Ashcroft dismissed Arar’s claim for relief under 
the Torture Victim Protection Act because he failed to allege that the 
American agents who allegedly authorized his torture “possessed 
power under Syrian law . . . .”118  
Judge Pooler, however, dissenting in Arar, criticizes the majority’s 
treatment of the “color of law” requirement in the TVPA and provides 
an important counterpoint about why Arar should have been allowed 
to raise a claim under the TVPA. Pooler writes that “[i]n construing 
[the color of law requirement] we look ‘to principles of agency law 
and to jurisprudence under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.’”119 Section 1983 
allows a person to pursue a civil action against an official for 
deprivation of that person’s constitutional rights.120 Pooler notes that 
                                                                                                                 
115
 See infra Part V.B.2 (discussing the nearly forty-year process of obtaining redress for 
Japanese Americans interned during the Second World War). 
116
 Pub. L. No. 102–256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
117
 Id. § 2(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
118
 Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 568 (2nd Cir. 2009). 
119
 Id. at 627 (Pooler, J., dissenting) (quoting Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir. 
1995).
120
 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (emphasis added): 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be 
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in 
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.  
One should note, however, that both Section 1983 and Bivens provide remedies for 
violations of constitutional rights; however, federal courts have distinguished the two causes of 
actions based on whether right exists under federal or state law, and whether the violator was a 
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“[u]nder Section 1983, ‘[t]he traditional definition of acting under 
color of state law requires that the defendant . . . have exercised 
power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only 
because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.’”121 
The crux of Pooler’s dissenting argument is that since private 
individuals who act in collaboration with state officials are clothed 
with “state law,” “non-Syrian actors who willfully participate in joint 
action with Syrian officials, acting under color of Syrian law, 
themselves act under color of Syrian law.”122 Pooler disagrees with 
the majority’s conclusion that “Arar’s pleading was deficient because 
he alleged only that ‘United States officials encouraged and facilitated 
the exercise of power by Syrians in Syria,’ not that defendants 
possessed power under Syrian law which they used to remove him to 
Syria to be tortured.”123 As Judge Pooler suggests, however, under 
principles of agency law, and especially for purposes of a cause of 
action under section 1983, “private individuals may be liable for joint 
activities with state actors even where those private individuals had 
no official power under state law.”124 Indeed, in interpreting the Alien 
Tort Statute,125 the Second Circuit has a precedent of applying 
principles of agency law to support claims against non-state actors.126 
At first glance, Judge Pooler’s argument may seem convoluted. It 
almost conceptualizes the United States as a quasi-private entity in 
terms of how the United States related to and acted under color of 
Syrian law. Because of this relationship, Pooler argues that the United 
                                                                                                                 
 
federal or a state actor. See Izen v. Catalina, 398 F.3d 363, 367 n.3 (5th Cir. 2005) (“A Bivens 
action is analogous to an action under § 1983—the only difference being that § 1983 applies to 
constitutional violations by state, rather than federal, officials.”) (quoting Evans v. Ball, 168 
F.3d 856, 863 n.10 (5th Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds by Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 
F.3d 939, 954–55 (5th Cir. 2003); see also Rogers v. Vicuna, 264 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2001) 
(differentiating between Bivens, which offers redress for constitutional violations under federal 
law, and Section 1983, which offers redress for violations under state law).  
121
 Arar, 585 F.3d, at 627 (Pooler, J., dissenting) (quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 
(1988)).  
122
 Id. at 629. 
123
 Id. at 628 (quoting Arar, 585 F.3d at 603 (majority opinion)). 
124
 Id. (Pooler, J., dissenting); see also Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27–28 (1980) (“[T]o 
act ‘under color of’ state law for § 1983 purposes does not require that the defendant be an 
officer of the State. It is enough that he is a willful participant in joint action with the State or its 
agents. Private persons, jointly engaged with state officials in the challenged action, are acting 
‘under color’ of law for purposes of § 1983 actions.”).  
125
 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).  
126
 See, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 188–89 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding 
plaintiffs adequately alleged the state action element of a claim under the Alien Tort Statute 
against Pfizer for non-consensual drug experimentation on Nigerian children); Khulumani v. 
Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 260 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that in the Second Circuit, a 
plaintiff may plead a theory of aiding and abetting under the Alien Tort Statute).  
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States should be liable for the Syrians’ torture of Arar. Her argument, 
however, is not as convoluted as it seems. It simply calls for greater 
accountability of American agents who have circumvented U.S. laws 
by transporting Arar to Syria with the knowledge that Syrian agents 
could interrogate him under conditions rising to the level of torture. If 
a private entity, with no official power under the law of a foreign 
state, can nevertheless be liable for operating jointly with that state, it 
should follow that a state actor acting jointly with another state actor 
should be equally liable.  
2. A Bivens Remedy Should Apply: Re-Examining the Majority’s 
Opinion in Arar 
As discussed above, the majority in Arar dismissed not only Arar’s 
cause of action under the Torture Victim Protection Act, but also his 
Bivens claim for relief.127 Judge Sack criticizes the majority’s 
particular treatment of “special factors that counsel hesitation” in its 
refusal to extend a Bivens cause of action to the context of 
extraordinary rendition. In his dissent, Judge Sack argues that “we 
think it mistaken to preclude Bivens relief solely in light of a citation 
or compilation of one or more purported examples of ‘special 
factors.’”128 Indeed, Sack seems to place much lower importance on 
circumstances that ultimately led to the dismissal of Arar’s case—
among them, the sensitive nature of the evidence surrounding the 
case—when he states that “the existence of such ‘special factors’ 
alone does not compel a conclusion that a Bivens action is 
unavailable.”129 
Instead, Judge Sack argues, the circumstances of Arar’s case in 
particular—“suffer[ing] a grievous infringement of his constitutional 
rights by one or more of the defendants,”130—lend support to judicial 
consideration of extending a Bivens action to victims of extraordinary 
rendition. Sack first emphasizes the argument that it seems “no more 
appropriate to await express congressional authorization of traditional 
judicial relief with regard to [the plaintiff’s constitutional] legal 
interests than with respect to interests protected by federal 
statutes.”131  
                                                                                                                 
127
 Arar, 585 F.3d at 580–81 (holding that a judicial Bivens remedy was inappropriate in 
the context of extraordinary rendition for reasons of national security and foreign affairs, absent 
explicit congressional authorization of a remedy for victims of extraordinary rendition).  
128
 Arar, 585 F.3d at 600 (Sack, J., dissenting).  
129
 Id.  
130
 Id. at 603. 
131
 Id. at 604 (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 
403 U.S. 388, 407 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment). Sack also relies on Judge 
165
1260 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:4 
Judge Sack’s dissent is persuasive because it underscores an 
important theme in the majority’s opinion in Arar: the recognition 
that Mr. Arar had suffered a legal injustice.132 Additionally, as Judge 
Sack notes, “Arar has no other remedy for the alleged harms the 
defendant officers inflicted on him.”133 It seems unfair then, as Judge 
Sack emphasizes, that the court would simultaneously acknowledge 
this injustice and refuse to extend any remedy. 
Yet despite the persuasive arguments in Judge Sack’s dissent in 
favor of extending a Bivens remedy for victims of torture by or at the 
behest of the U.S. government, the viability of such an argument 
remains unclear. In Vance v. Rumsfeld,134 the Seventh Circuit recently 
attempted to distinguish Arar by allowing a Bivens claim brought by 
U.S. citizens allegedly detained and tortured by U.S. military 
personnel in Iraq.135 The court in Vance particularly emphasized that 
“nothing in [Arar and similar cases] indicates that those courts were 
willing to extend the unprecedented immunity that [the federal 
government] . . . advocate[s] here, for claims that our government 
tortured its own citizens.”136 The opinion in Vance, then, would have 
represented an important first step in allowing a Bivens remedy—at 
least for U.S. citizens—in such cases. On October 28, 2011, however, 
the Seventh Circuit granted the government’s petition for a rehearing 
en banc, and vacated the opinion.137 As of the writing of this Note, the 
Seventh Circuit has not scheduled oral arguments for the case.  
                                                                                                                 
 
Posner’s argument in Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190, 194 (7th Cir. 1989): 
[I]f ever there were a strong case for ‘substantive due process,’ it would be a case in 
which a person who had been arrested but not charged or convicted was brutalized 
while in custody. . . . [I]t would be surprising if the wanton or malicious infliction of 
severe pain or suffering upon a person confined following his arrest but not yet 
charged or convicted were thought consistent with due process. 
132
 See Arar, 585 F.3d at 580 (“None of this is to say that extraordinary rendition is or 
should be a favored policy choice.”). 
133
 Id. at 605 (Sack, J., dissenting).  
134
 653 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated 653 F.3d 591 (7th 
Cir. Oct. 28, 2011). 
135
 Id. at 622 (distinguishing the claims brought by U.S. citizens in this case, as opposed to 
claims brought by foreign nations in Arar and other similar cases, and holding that “we should 
not let the difficulty of [Arar and other extraordinary rendition cases] lead us to lose sight of the 
fundamentally different situation posed by the claims of civilian U.S. citizens in this case”). 
136
 Id.  
137
 Vance v. Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d 591, 591 (7th Cir. Oct. 28, 2011) (noting that a rehearing 
en banc was granted and that the opinion was vacated). 
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3. Exceptions to the State Secret Doctrine When the Government Is 
Arguably Premising Privilege on Violation of Domestic and 
International Law Regarding Torture 
An exception to the state secrets doctrine where the government is 
premising its privilege on a violation of domestic and international 
law regarding torture would remedy the problem of dismissal of 
extraordinary rendition victims’ cases on “state secrets” grounds.138 
The dissent in Jeppesen addresses this issue, particularly as it applies 
to the dismissal of Binyam Mohamed and his co-plaintiffs’ case at the 
pleadings stage.139  
At the heart of the dissent’s argument, then, is the belief that the 
majority has reached its decision at a premature stage, despite the 
potential validity of the government’s claim of privilege under 
Reynolds, by dismissing the plaintiffs’ case at the pleadings level. The 
dissent argues instead that if “Plaintiffs here have stated a claim on 
which relief can be granted, they should have an opportunity to 
present evidence in support of their allegations, without regard for the 
likelihood of ultimate success.”140 The dissent would remand the case 
for further proceedings in order for the lower court to “determine 
what evidence is privileged and whether any such evidence is 
indispensable either to Plaintiffs’ prima facie case or to a valid 
defense otherwise available to Jeppesen. Only if privileged evidence 
is indispensible to either party should it dismiss the complaint.”141 
                                                                                                                 
138
 One commentator has proposed a framework for non-U.S. citizen victims of 
extraordinary rendition that continues to use the traditional – albeit increasingly difficult – 
recourse of the federal court system. See, e.g., Andrew Kingman, Note, State Secrets Are a 
Privilege, Not a Right: Can Foreign Victims of Extraordinary Rendition and Torture Overcome 
the State Secrets Privilege Using the Alien Tort Statute?, 16 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 
118, 141–146 (2011) (arguing that non-U.S. citizens should continue to bring claims under the 
Alien Tort Claims Act; that Congress should pass legislation limiting the government’s ability 
to raise state secrets as a defense; and that plaintiffs should choose their appellate jurisdiction 
carefully to avoid circuits particularly hostile to torture and extraordinary rendition claims).  
139
 Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1098 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied 
131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011) (mem.) (Hawkins, J., dissenting): 
Whatever validity there may be to the idea that evidentiary privileges can apply at 
the pleadings stage, it is wrong to suggest that such an application would permit the 
removal of entire allegations resulting in out-and-out dismissal of the entire suit. 
Instead, the state secrets privilege operates at the pleadings stage to except from the 
implications of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 8(b)(6) the refusal to answer 
certain allegations, not, as the government contends, to permit the government or 
Jeppesen to avoid filing a responsive pleading at all. 
see also FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(6) (“An allegation—other than one relating to the amount of 
damages—is admitted if a responsive pleading is required and the allegation is not denied. If a 
responsive pleading is not required, an allegation is considered denied or avoided.”). 
140
 Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1100 (Hawkins, J., dissenting). 
141
 Id. at 1101. 
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The dissent in Jeppesen posits an interesting theory of the 
feasibility of an alleged victim’s case. Extraordinary rendition cases 
are unique (and frustrating) from an evidentiary perspective in that 
they involve facts that may tend to corroborate allegations of abuse by 
the government. If the holdings in Arar and Jeppesen are any 
indication, however, it would be difficult for the plaintiff to overcome 
governmental claims of privilege for state secrets. Certainly, the best-
case scenario would be a congressional statutory exception to (or at 
least a more narrow definition of) the judicially created Reynolds 
privilege,142 particularly in cases that would tend to imply that the 
government itself is in violation of domestic or international law. 
Barring that, or a Supreme Court case overruling the doctrines of state 
secret privilege espoused in Reynolds, it seems unlikely that the 
current judicial interpretations of the Bivens action and the state 
secrets doctrine will change. 
B. Non-Judicial Remedies: Providing Compensation to Victims 
The counterpoints expressed in the dissenting opinions in both 
Arar and Jeppesen challenge the rationale of leaving the fate of 
victims of extraordinary rendition to the whim of the legislature or 
other non-judicial entities—entities that are (theoretically) more 
influenced by popular will or dissatisfaction than the judiciary. The 
counterarguments expressed in Arar and Jeppesen are important to 
understanding the development of the law in the context of providing 
some sort of future judicial remedy for victims of extraordinary 
rendition. But it seems unlikely that victims of extraordinary rendition 
will find relief in the court systems in the near future. Rather, relief 
for victims of extraordinary rendition must come in the form of a non-
judicial remedy, which would include some form of compensation for 
the victims. This relief, as the following examples will demonstrate, 
could potentially arise from any combination of legislative action, 
executive action, investigative action initiated by governmental or 
                                                                                                                 
142
 At least one bill proposed in Congress would have limited the state secrets privilege in 
such a way. See State Secrets Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 984, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 417, 
111th Cong. (2009) (proposing a series of evidentiary proceedings, including in camera 
proceedings and other evidentiary hearings, to simultaneously protect the government’s right to 
assert the state secrets privilege in any civil action, and allow litigants to proceed with 
meaningful discovery). One commentator has advocated for Congress to pass a “State Secrets 
Act,” which would go far in narrowing the executive branch’s ability to assert the state secrets 
privilege.” Kingman, supra note 138, at 143. On November 5, 2009, the House Committee on 
the Judiciary ordered the State Secrets Act of 2009 reported to the House of Representatives for 
consideration. However, as of the writing of this Note, the House has not taken further action. 
See 155 CONG. REC. D1297–98 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 2009) (reporting the actions of the House 
Committee on the Judiciary ordering H.R. 984 reported to the House of Representatives).  
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non-governmental entities, or the diligent effort of public interest 
organizations. In spite of the dissents’ misgivings in Arar and 
Jeppesen, this may mean subjecting victims more directly to public 
suspicion and hostility toward alleged suspected terrorists. Only 
through open, public, non-judicial actions, however, can victims of 
extraordinary rendition overcome the state secrets doctrine and 
achieve any meaningful redress for their injuries.   
This Section begins by emphasizing the precedent for 
compensation of victims of extraordinary rendition that the Canadian 
government has already accomplished in the case of Maher Arar. The 
discussion then turns to the case of the Japanese Americans interned 
during World War II in the United States. The example of the 
Japanese American internment is important for two reasons: first, it 
established a significant precedent for victims of governmental abuses 
of power; and second, the method by which Japanese Americans 
received compensation was unique. Finally, the following discussion 
examines potential proposals for non-judicial compensation for 
victims of extraordinary rendition, as well as what challenges such 
proposals would face in light of the Arar and Jeppesen cases.  
As a preliminary note, the government of the United Kingdom 
announced in July, 2010 that it would consider mediation and 
compensation claims with Mohamed and other detainees at 
Guantanamo Bay.143 At the end of 2010, the British government 
declared that it would compensate Binyam Mohamed and other 
Guantanamo Bay detainees for abuses that they suffered.144 The 
British government also indicated its desire to conduct an inquiry into 
the allegations of detainee abuse by British intelligence and security 
officials.145 Prime Minister David Cameron appointed Sir Peter 
                                                                                                                 
143
 See Prime Minister David Cameron, A Statement Given by the Prime Minister to the 
House of Commons on the Treatment of Terror Suspects (July 6, 2010) (transcript available at 
http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/statements-and-articles/2010/07/statement-on-detainees-
52943) [hereinafter Terror Suspect Statement] (“[W]e are committed to mediation with those 
who have brought civil claims about their detention in Guantanamo. And wherever appropriate, 
we will offer compensation.”).  
144
 See John F. Burns & Alan Cowell, Britain to Compensate Guantánamo Detainees, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 17, 2010, at A14 (reporting the plan of the British government to pay potentially 
millions of dollars to former Guantanamo detainees, including Binyam Mohamed); Patrick 
Wintour, Guantánamo Bay Detainees to Be Paid Compensation by UK Government, THE 
GUARDIAN, Nov. 16 2010, at 1 (reporting that the UK’s motivation for providing compensation 
is that “it is in the national interest that the cases are not brought to court so as to protect the 
[methods of the MI6] from scrutiny” and “settlement of the claims would allow an inquiry to be 
undertaken . . . .”). 
145
 See Terror Suspect Statement, supra note 143: 
As soon as we’ve made enough progress, an independent Inquiry will be held. It will 
look at whether Britain was implicated in the improper treatment of detainees held 
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Gibson, a prominent British attorney, judge and commissioner, as 
Chair of the newly formed Detainee Inquiry on July 6, 2010.146 
Human rights organizations criticized the work of the Inquiry from 
the beginning, however,147 and on January 18, 2012, the British 
government disbanded it.148 Therefore, this discussion will primarily 
concentrate on the Canadian inquiry into the treatment of Maher Arar.   
1. Relief for Maher Arar: The Canadian Example 
The unfortunate reality of a post-September 11, 2001 world is that 
many, if not all, American allies have been touched in one way or 
another by American efforts to combat terrorism. Further, they have 
had to cope with an increasingly international and multi-border threat 
of terrorism. The means with which other countries have approached 
terrorist threats—and particularly the steps they have taken to correct 
wrongs committed in the course of their efforts to minimize terrorist 
threats—are fascinating case studies and potential models for similar 
United States compensation and redress programs.  
In 2006, a Canadian Commission of Inquiry released a report 
detailing the treatment of Maher Arar, a Canadian citizen, at the 
hands of the U.S. government and the Syrian government based on 
information that the Canadian government obtained about Maher 
Arar.149 The Report of the Arar Commission states that in the 
aftermath of September 11, American officials “pressed their allies to 
                                                                                                                 
 
by other countries that may have occurred in the aftermath of 9/11. And if we were, 
what went wrong, and what do we need to do to learn the lessons. 
146
 Panel Members, THE DETAINEE INQUIRY, 
http://www.detaineeinquiry.org.uk/people/panel-members/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2012).  
147
 See United Kingdom: Detainee Inquiry Terms of Reference and Protocol Fall Far Short 
of Human Rights Standards, AMNESTY INT’L, *1 (Aug. 4, 2011), 
http://amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR45/011/2011/en/36101b51-1a33-4528-8895-
6bccd7158dcf/eur450112011en.pdf (expressing concern about the extent to which the 
proceedings would be public, detainees would have procedural protections, and outside 
evidence could be introduced into the Inquiry’s hearings); see also International Human Rights 
Experts Call for Key Changes to the Detainee Inquiry as Abdul Hakim Belhadj Joins List of 
Survivors Refusing to Participate, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Jan. 6, 2012), 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/01/06/international-human-rights-experts-call-key-changes-
detainee-inquiry-abdul-hakim-bel (discussing criticism by prominent human rights officials of 
the Detainee Inquiry’s powers and mandate).  
148
 See Owen Bowcott et al., Inquiry into MI5 and MI6 Torture Roles Abandoned, THE 
GUARDIAN, Jan. 19, 2012, at 4 (discussing that, although the British government has expressed 
continued interest in a formal inquiry, it has abandoned the current Detainee Inquiry after 
numerous human rights organizations voiced their opposition to it).  
149
 See generally Comm’n of Inquiry into the Actions of Can. Officials in Relation to 
Maher Arar, Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar: Analysis and Recommendations 
(2006), available at http://www.pch.gc.ca/cs-kc/arar/Arar_e.pdf. [hereinafter Arar 
Commission]. 
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assist [the War on Terror] by investigating terrorist threats within 
their borders. Canada received an enormous number of requests for 
information from the FBI and the CIA related to all aspects of 9/11, 
as well as other potential or suspected terrorist threats.”150 The 
Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) delegated to the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police151 “prime responsibility for the 
investigation of a number of individuals suspected of terrorist 
links.”152 
The Report concludes with a series of twenty-three policy 
recommendations directed toward the Canadian government.153 
Recommendation 22, however, specifically recommends that the 
“Government of Canada should register a formal objection with the 
governments of the United States and Syria concerning their 
treatment of Mr. Arar and Canadian officials involved with his 
case.”154 The Commission cites the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations,155 noting that under the Convention “a contracting state has 
an obligation to inform a foreign national of his or her right to contact 
consular officials and to facilitate such contact without delay.”156 
Regarding Canada’s cooperation with American officials in joint 
terrorism investigations, the Report continues that “Canada has an 
obligation to correct any inaccurate information about [Arar] that it 
may have provided to American authorities.”157 Recommendation 22 
                                                                                                                 
150
 Id. at 66.  
151
 Part of the efforts by Royal Canadian Mounted Police was Project A-O Canada, a 
“criminal investigation . . . [whose] focus was to investigate terrorist threats to Canada’s 
national security and to co-operate [sic] with others, particularly [Canadian Security Intelligence 
Service] and its American partner agencies, in the investigation of those threats.” Id. at 73. 
152
 Id.at 66. Among the individuals under investigation were Abdullah Almalki and Ahmed 
El Maati. Id. at 72. El Maati was “allegedly implicated in a terrorist plot directed at a major 
Canadian target.” Id. Part of the basis for Arar’s detention was his knowledge of and 
relationship to Almalki and El Maati. Id. at 72–73. 
153
 See id. at 312–363. The majority of the recommendations detail the means through 
which future national security and terrorism conducted by RCMP, CSIS and other agencies 
should take particular care to respect human rights and should be particularly careful in 
collaboration with countries having questionable human rights records.  
154
 Id. at 361.  
155
 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 
261 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
156
 Arar Commission, supra note 149, at 172; see also Vienna Convention, supra note 155, 
at art. 36(1)(b) (providing that if a foreign national is arrested, any communication he or she 
makes must be forwarded to authorities from his or her state). The Report notes that: 
[W]hile [Arar was] in custody at [John F. Kennedy International Airport] in New 
York, he had asked to see someone from the Canadian Consulate. The Consulate 
General in New York was never contacted concerning Mr. Arar’s request. Moreover, 
Mr. Arar was held in American custody for four days without access to a lawyer or 
his family. Essentially, no one knew where he was. 
Arar Commission, supra note 149, at 172. 
157
 Arar Commission, supra note 149, at 362.  
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concludes with an assessment of Arar’s treatment in Syria, and Justice 
Dennis O’Connor concludes that: 
[T]he Syrian authorities tortured Mr. Arar when interrogating 
him and held him in inhumane and degrading conditions for 
about a year. Moreover . . . they misled Canadian officials 
about Mr. Arar’s presence in Syria after he first arrived there. 
If Canada has not already done so, it should send a formal 
objection to the Syrians.158 
Recommendation 23 finds that “[t]he Government of Canada 
should assess Mr. Arar’s claim for compensation in the light of the 
findings in this report and respond accordingly.”159 In addressing 
compensation the Report stresses that “the Government of Canada 
should avoid applying a strictly legal assessment to its potential 
liability.”160 Recommendation 23 notes that, “[b]ased on the 
assumption that holding a public inquiry has served the public 
interest, Mr. Arar’s role in it and the additional suffering he has 
experienced because of it should be recognized as a relevant factor in 
deciding whether compensation is warranted.”161 
Significant in Recommendation 23 is the conclusion that the 
Commission is “specifically precluded from making any findings (or 
even assessments) as to whether the Government of Canada would be 
civilly liable to Mr. Arar.”162 If a theoretical American Commission 
were to preclude a finding of negligence, this preclusion may not be 
as important because Arar’s case was already dismissed in the United 
States; however, Recommendation 23 highlights the point that such a 
commission would not have to assess legal liability against the U.S. 
government in order to achieve the goals of redress and 
compensation.  
In addition to discussing these theories of compensation, the 
Commission makes a particular point to clear Arar’s reputation in the 
Report, stressing that: 
                                                                                                                 
158
 Id.  
159
 Id.  
160
 Id. at 363.  
161
 Id. Arar’s mistreatment in Syria is accepted by the Commission, and documented in the 
factual background of his cases in the United States. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 566 
(2d Cir. 2009) (discussing the details of Arar’s mistreatment in Syria and his confinement to a 
tiny underground cell); Arar Commission, supra note 149, at 32 (“The actions of the [Syrian 
Military Intelligence] with respect to Mr. Arar were entirely consistent with Syria’s widespread 
reputation for abusing prisoners being held in connection with terrorism-related 
investigations.”).  
162
 Arar Commission, supra note 149, at 362.  
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[It had] heard evidence concerning all of the information 
gathered by Canadian investigators in relation to Mr. Arar . . . 
[and was] able to say categorically that there is no evidence to 
indicate that Mr. Arar has committed any offence [sic] or that 
his activities constitute a threat to the security of Canada.163  
As a result of the report, the Canadian government did reach a $10 
million settlement with Arar related to Canada’s role in the United 
States’ removal of Arar to Syria, and the Canadian government 
adopted all twenty-three recommendations in the Report.164 
2. Compensation to the Japanese Interned During the Second World 
War 
The experience of the Japanese immigrants and Americans of 
Japanese ancestry provides an illustrative, pertinent, and relatively 
recent example of an entire class of persons mistreated by the U.S. 
government who, after more than forty years, had their grievances 
compensated and redressed through non-judicial remedies. The 
controversial cases discussed in this section, which upheld the 
constitutionality of Japanese internment during World War II, have 
never been explicitly overruled. Despite this uncomfortable fact, 
hundreds of Japanese Americans obtained appropriate redress and 
compensation as a result of efforts by Japanese Americans, 
particularly Japanese American members of Congress, during the 
1970’s. The example of redress and compensation for Japanese 
Americans could provide an important precedent for victims of 
extraordinary rendition because a similar model would allow victims 
of extraordinary rendition to achieve a meaningful remedy outside 
of—and despite—established jurisprudence which would seem to bar 
them from seeking a remedy in the courts.165  
a. Japanese Internment During the Second World War  
After the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, 
anti-Japanese sentiment166 came to a head when, in 1942, President 
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Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066,167 which authorized the 
Secretary of War and military commanders:  
to prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent 
as he or the appropriate Military Commander may determine, 
from which any or all persons may be excluded, and with 
respect to which, the right of any person to enter, remain in, 
or leave shall be subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary 
of War or the appropriate Military Commander may impose 
in his discretion.168 
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the 
exclusion of the Japanese from the West Coast after the bombing of 
Pearl Harbor in 1941, as well as their subsequent internment in 
military-controlled camps for the duration of the war, in two 
important cases: Korematsu v. United States169 and Hirabayashi v. 
United States.170 In both cases, the plaintiffs had been convicted of 
violating the Act of Congress of March 21, 1942,171 which made it a 
misdemeanor for anyone to: 
enter, remain in, leave, or commit any act in any military area 
or military zone prescribed, under the authority of an 
Executive order of the President, by the Secretary of War, or 
by any military commander designated by the Secretary of 
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 Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942).  
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 Id. (justifying the imposition of such exclusions and restrictions by noting that “the 
successful prosecution of the war requires every possible protection against espionage and 
against sabotage to national-defense material, national-defense premises, and national-defense 
utilities”).  
169
 323 U.S. 214 (1944).  
170
 320 U.S. 81 (1943).  
171
 Pub. L. No. 77–503, ch. 191, 56 Stat. 173 (1942).  
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War, contrary to the restrictions applicable to any such area 
or zone . . . .172  
In Hirabayashi, the plaintiff, a Japanese American who resided in 
Seattle, Washington (at the time a part of the West Coast military 
zone) was convicted of specifically violating (1) a curfew that persons 
of Japanese ancestry had to remain in their homes between 8:00 p.m. 
and 6:00 a.m.; and (2) failing to appear at a Civil Control Station to 
register, prior to the eventual evacuation of persons of Japanese 
ancestry from the military zone.173 The issue for the Court, then, 
became whether there was a “substantial basis” for the decision by 
Congress and the commander of the military zone that “the curfew as 
applied was a protective measure necessary to meet the threat of 
sabotage and espionage which would substantially affect the war 
effort and which might reasonably be expected to aid a threatened 
enemy invasion.”174 The Court ultimately concluded that the curfew 
on persons of Japanese ancestry—including persons born in the 
United States whose only connection to Japan was a Japanese last 
name and certain physical traits—was reasonable because “Congress 
and the Executive could reasonably have concluded that [cultural 
preservation within the Japanese community has] encouraged the 
continued attachment of members of this group to Japan and Japanese 
institutions.”175 
The specific military order at issue in Korematsu was Civilian 
Exclusion Order No. 34, which ordered that after May 9, 1942 “all 
persons of Japanese ancestry” were to be excluded from the West 
Coast exclusion zone.176 Fred Korematsu was convicted of 
“remaining in San Leandro, California, a ‘Military Area,’ contrary to 
Civilian Order No. 34 of the Commanding General of the Western 
Command.”177 The Supreme Court upheld this conviction, stating that 
“when under conditions of modern warfare our shores are threatened 
by hostile forces, the power to protect must be commensurate with the 
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 See Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 83–84 (detailing Hirabayashi’s violations of the 
prescribed military orders concerning persons of Japanese ancestry).  
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 Id. at 95.  
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 Id. at 98. In its decision, the Court enumerates certain elements of cultural preservation 
that supports a reasonable conclusion by Congress and the Executive that the Japanese 
community was a potential breeding ground for espionage. Among the evidence that the Court 
cites are Japanese language schools in the United States which operated outside regular school 
hours; Japanese laws which, under certain circumstances, recognized children of Japanese 
immigrants born in the United States as Japanese citizens; and the fact that many persons of 
Japanese ancestry in the United States were “of mature years and occup[ied] positions of 
influence in Japanese communities.” See id. at 96–98. 
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 Korematsu v. United States 323 U.S. 214, 215–16 (1944).  
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 Id.  
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threatened danger.”178 The Court rejected Korematsu’s argument of 
unequal protection. It seemed satisfied with the reasonableness of the 
exclusion order given the circumstances of the U.S. war with Japan, 
and summarized the justifications for Congressional and military 
action against the Japanese on the West Coast as follows: 
Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because 
of hostility to him or his race. He was excluded because we 
[were] at war with the Japanese Empire, because the properly 
constituted military authorities feared an invasion of our West 
Coast and felt constrained to take proper security measures, 
because they decided that the military urgency of the situation 
demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated 
from the West Coast temporarily, and finally, because 
Congress, reposing its confidence in this time of war in our 
military leaders—as inevitably it must—determined that they 
should have the power to do just this.179 
The Supreme Court’s specific holding in Korematsu with respect 
to the internment of the Japanese Americans has never been 
overturned. Despite the difficulty of this legal precedent, the Japanese 
American community, after a nearly forty year struggle, achieved 
redress, compensation, and a formal apology through congressional 
legislation. This represents an important precedent for victims of 
extraordinary rendition: such victims will have to work towards non-
judicial redress and compensation while remaining cognizant that the 
federal courts seem committed to upholding the state secrets doctrine.  
b. The Japanese American Movement for Redress and Compensation 
At the beginning of the 1970s, the Japanese American community, 
undoubtedly influenced by the civil rights movements of the 1960s, 
faced two questions: whether the community should seek redress 
from the federal government, and, if so, what should redress look 
like?180 Many of the early redress efforts that ultimately led the way 
to the creation of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and 
Internment of Civilians181 were led by the Japanese American 
Citizens League (“JACL”).182 The general movement toward redress 
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 MITCHELL T. MAKI ET AL., ACHIEVING THE IMPOSSIBLE DREAM: HOW JAPANESE 
AMERICANS OBTAINED REDRESS 64 (1999).  
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 See infra Part V.B.2.c (discussing the creation and findings of the commission).  
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 See About the Japanese American Citizens League, JACL, 
http://www.jacl.org/about/about.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2012) (describing the history, vision, 
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at the end of the 1970’s was bolstered by a growing positive 
perception of Japanese Americans in American society generally, and 
a diminishing of pre- and post-war stereotypes about Japanese 
Americans.183 
Three early achievements for redress that the JACL accomplished 
were decidedly non-monetary in nature. The first of these was the 
repeal of Title II of the Internal Security Act of 1950.184 Title II of the 
Act, passed during the communist scare of the Cold War era, gave the 
federal government the power to seize and hold persons suspected of 
espionage, sabotage, or insurrection.185 On September 25, 1971 
President Nixon signed a bill,186 introduced by Senator Daniel Inouye, 
to repeal the Act.187 In terms of redress to victims of the Japanese 
internment, the repeal of the Act was “largely symbolic;” however it 
represented an important step in the redress movement because “it 
provided the Japanese American community with political experience 
in obtaining federal legislation.”188 From a framework perspective, 
repealing the bill also helped undo some of the legislative and legal 
foundations impeding the redress movement. 
The second early achievement in the redress movement was 
President Ford’s revocation of Executive Order 9066 on February 19, 
1976.189 Later that same year, President Ford signed legislation 
repealing Public Law 77-503, which had attached criminal penalties 
to Executive Order 9066.190 The repeal of Executive Order 9066 
represented not only a legislative victory for the redress movement, 
                                                                                                                 
 
and mission of the Japanese American Citizens League).  
183
 See MAKI, supra note 180, at 83 (noting that the shift in Japanese stereotypes in the 
1970s). 
184
 Pub. L. No. 81–831, 64 Stat. 987, 1019 (1950). 
185
 Id. at 1019–21; see also MAKI, supra note 180, at 65 (describing the provisions of the 
Act and noting that the Act used the Japanese exclusion cases as a legal justification for its 
passage).  
186
 Act of Sept. 25, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92–128, 85 Stat. 347 (1971).  
187
 See MAKI, supra note 180, at 65–66 (discussing the history of the repeal of Title II of 
the Internal Security Act of 1950).  
188
 Id. at 66.  
189
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but also an important early public acknowledgement of the injustices 
of the Japanese American internment.191 
Finally, the third early achievement in the redress movement was 
President Ford’s pardon of Iva Ikuko Toguri d’Aquino, the Japanese 
American better known as “Tokyo Rose.”192 Toguri d’Aquino was 
charged with treason for allegedly broadcasting Japanese propaganda 
to U.S. troops in the Pacific during World War II.193 As a result of 
pressure from the Japanese American community and evidence 
tending to negate her guilt, Toguri d’Aquino received a full pardon on 
President Ford’s last day in office in 1977.194 The lesson was 
important for the Japanese American community because it 
demonstrated that “through political maneuvering and community 
involvement, past wrongs could be addressed.”195 
c. The Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of 
Civilians 
While the three accomplishments toward achieving redress 
described above were significant, in many ways they were largely 
symbolic. Indeed, toward the end of the 1970s, many Japanese 
American legislators expressed their doubts about the achievability of 
real redress.196 A debate arose within the Japanese American 
community as to whether a presidential commission would be the best 
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 See Remarks Upon Signing a Proclamation Concerning Japanese-American Internment 
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 Id. at 86 (“During the late 1970s, not one of the [Japanese American] legislators was 
convinced that redress was a viable legislative issue; instead they viewed it as a political 
liability.”). Interestingly enough, though his legislative efforts later helped Japanese Americans 
achieve compensation, when initially asked about redress, Representative Norman Mineta 
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means of achieving redress and compensation for victims of exclusion 
and internment during World War II. Supporters of such a 
commission argued that without a commission established by the 
president and endorsed by Congress, “monetary redress legislation 
might be seen as special-interest litigation and result in a political 
backlash against the [Japanese American] community.”197 Opponents 
warned not only of the risk that a commission might give an 
unfavorable recommendation, but also that older, first-generation 
Japanese Americans might die before hearings commenced, or might 
be unwilling to testify about their painful experiences in the 
internment camps.198 
Alongside the JACL, grassroots movements began to arise that 
also advocated redress for Japanese Americans. Some of these 
grassroots movements arose out of involvement with local issues in 
the Japanese and greater Asian American communities and had 
become disillusioned with the progress of the JACL.199 One of these 
groups was the National Coalition of Redress/Reparations (NCRR).200 
The NCRR identified five goals and principles for properly achieving 
redress for the Japanese American community: (1) “monetary 
compensation to individuals incarcerated or their heirs,” (2) some 
form of “restitution to the Japanese American community, (3) the 
overturning of the legal basis that justified the evacuation and the 
camps,” (4) support for other minority groups who had unjustly 
suffered from U.S. government actions, and (5) “education of the 
American public.”201 
Bolstered by the support of groups within the Japanese American 
community that advocated clear goals of redress, Congress passed the 
Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians 
Act.202 The Act provided for seven commissioners: three chosen by 
the President, two by the Speaker of the House, and two by the 
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President Pro Tempore of the Senate.203 Commissioners included 
former cabinet members, a former Supreme Court justice, a former 
ambassador, and clergy members.204 The Commission on Wartime 
Relocation and Internment of Civilians (CWRIC) held hearings for 
twenty days, primarily in cities along the west coast of the United 
States.205 The CWRIC heard testimony from legislators and 
community leaders—Japanese and non-Japanese alike. Perhaps the 
most powerful testimony was that of those Japanese Americans who 
vividly and painfully recalled their experiences in the camps.206 
The CWRIC compiled the testimony from the hearings and 
published its findings in 1982.207 One of its most notable findings was 
that, although it had since been repealed, the promulgation of 
Executive Order 9066 was not justified by military necessity, but 
caused instead by “race prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of 
political leadership.”208 Indeed, despite the Supreme Court’s holdings 
in Hirabayashi and Korematsu, the Commission gathered evidence 
and heard testimony from many architects and former supporters of 
the Japanese American exclusion plan regretting their decisions.209 As 
the Commission noted, however, “in the spring of 1942 . . . not even 
the courts of the United States were places of calm and dispassionate 
justice.”210 
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With respect to the economic loss that the Japanese Americans 
suffered as a result of their forcible exclusion and internment, the 
Commission acknowledged that the evacuees had little time to settle 
their affairs, and testimony from evacuees indicated that government 
efforts allegedly aimed at securing and protecting property were 
unsuccessful.211 Indeed, while in relocation centers, many evacuees 
learned of the destruction and looting of their homes and businesses; 
others discovered their losses only after returning home.212 
Ultimately, the Commission found that “[t]he loss of time, of 
potential and of property were to many of the evacuees irreparable 
blows—financial blows from which many never wholly 
recovered.”213 
Perhaps the most important issue that the Commission addressed 
was the harsh conditions in the camps. Though the government 
allegedly established the camps to “protect” the Japanese American 
civilians, they more closely resembled prisons than protective 
facilities. The Commission noted that “the camps were built by the 
War Department according to its own specifications. Barbed-wire 
fences, watchtowers, and armed guards surrounded the residential and 
administrative areas of most camps.”214 Although the military police 
guarding the centers were meant to only guard the exterior in case of 
an emergency, as tensions and discontent rose in the camps, police 
shootings of prisoners—whether intentionally or because of 
miscommunications—were not uncommon.215 The original residential 
design and facilities in the camps were equally Spartan. The initial 
design of the buildings provided for no internal walls or ceilings, 
although they were later crudely winterized. There was no running 
water in the rooms, and the quarters were designed as military 
barracks.216 Additionally, many camps had inadequate medical care 
for the evacuees.217 
One year after publishing its report, the Commission published its 
recommendations.218 The CWRIC made five principal 
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recommendations: (1) a joint resolution by Congress apologizing for 
the injustice, signed by the President; (2) a formal presidential pardon 
for all Japanese Americans convicted of violations of any curfew or 
exclusion order; (3) a congressional order directing executive 
agencies to liberally review Japanese Americans’ applications for 
restitution; (4) appropriations for research and public educational 
funding; and (5) appropriations for individual compensation to 
surviving evacuees and internees.219 The CWRIC also issued a series 
of recommendations for Aleutian Islanders who were also relocated 
during the war.220 
d. A Community Achieves Justice: The Legacy of the Commission  
Based on the recommendations submitted by the Commission on 
Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, relief finally came 
for persons of Japanese descent interned during World War II in the 
form of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988.221 The purpose of the Act was 
to, among other things: (1) acknowledge injustices of the Japanese 
internment; (2) issue a formal apology on behalf of the United States 
to those who were interned; (3) provide funding for public education 
about the Japanese internment experience; and (4) make restitution to 
Japanese Americans who were interned, as well as individuals of the 
Aleutian Islands who were evacuated during World War II.222 Indeed, 
as Sandra Taylor notes in her essay about the Japanese internment 
experience, the Civil Liberties Act was significant because “[n]ever 
before had the government granted such redress to an entire group of 
citizens for a deprivation of their constitutional rights.”223 Part of the 
success for the passage of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 is that it 
was supported by a broad spectrum of organizations—many of which 
were not specifically ethnically “Japanese”224—and proponents of the 
bill took “advantage of those organizations’ contacts, membership, 
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resources, and political expertise to pressure Congress [to pass the 
bill]. ”225 
It is relevant to note the expectations of the Japanese American 
community during the movement for redress. At the beginning of the 
movement to urge Congress and the President to create a commission 
in the late 1970s, Representative Robert Matsui “urged Japanese 
Americans not to have unrealistic expectations about the 
commission.”226 The legacy of the CWRIC, however, is that it helped 
remind the entire American public that “redress was about more than 
lofty principles, historic revision, and constitutional issues. Redress 
was about real people who had endured real suffering. Redress was a 
human issue.”227  
No single act or circumstance contributed to the passage of the 
Civil Liberties Act of 1988 in Congress; rather, passage was bolstered 
by the documentation gathered by the CWRIC, the coalition of 
diverse groups who came together in support of the redress 
movement, and the bill’s portrayal as a constitutional issue.228 Two 
additional factors also contributed to the passage of the bill: the 
leadership of Representative Barney Frank229 as chair of House 
Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental 
Relations, and the efforts of Senator Spark Matsunaga, who “all but 
guaranteed that the bill would pass in the Senate by a veto-proof 
margin.”230 
Finally, three key factors influenced President Ronald Reagan’s 
signing of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988. The first was the manner in 
which Governor Thomas Kean, then the Republican Governor of 
New Jersey, presented the bill to him. Governor Kean presented the 
bill to President Reagan on an anecdotal level and reminded him of a 
medal ceremony posthumously honoring a young Japanese American 
staff sergeant killed during World War II—at which a young Captain 
Ronald Reagan gave a brief speech to the family.231 The second was 
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the relative importance of the bill to the President and his 
administration. While of great importance to the Japanese American 
community, the bill was not a major bill for Reagan or his 
administration in terms of its political significance for the 
administration.232 Finally, Congress and President Reagan were able 
to work toward a compromise on key aspects of the bill.233 
C. Following Precedent: Establishing a Commission of Inquiry to 
Achieve Redress for Victims of Extraordinary Rendition 
The example of compensation and redress for Japanese Americans 
and Aleutian Islanders evacuated from their homes or interned in 
prison camps during the Second World War is an important 
foundation for exploring issues of redress for other groups wronged 
by U.S. government actions. For victims of extraordinary rendition, it 
is an important precedent in two respects: (1) it provides a framework 
for a neutral commission to gather testimony and conduct an 
independent investigation into the alleged government wrongdoing; 
and (2) while Japanese Americans ultimately achieved some 
monetary compensation, the history of the Japanese American redress 
movement exemplifies various monetary and non-monetary forms of 
redress that Japanese Americans achieved. This is particularly 
important in the context of a movement to secure redress for victims 
of extraordinary rendition in the United States, where monetary 
redress is likely not realistic.234 Thus, it is likely that any redress 
efforts for victims of extraordinary rendition would primarily be non-
monetary.235 
                                                                                                                 
 
(recounting the story of when President Reagan, as a young actor, paid tribute to the fallen 
Japanese soldier by giving a speech at his medal ceremony and affirming, “here we admit a 
wrong; here we reaffirm our commitment as a nation to equal justice under the law.”).  
232
 MAKI, supra note 180, at 197.  
233
 Id. (noting that President Reagan “felt that Congress had met his administration’s 
concerns halfway, and he recognized that since H.R. 442 was an authorization bill, further 
concerns could be addressed in the subsequent appropriations bill”). 
234
 As the Canadian example demonstrates, however, it is certainly not unprecedented. See 
CBC NEWS, supra note 164 (“Ottawa has reached a $10-million settlement with Maher Arar 
over Canada’s role in a U.S. decision to deport him to Syria, where he was jailed and 
tortured.”). Furthermore, in spite of suspending a formal inquiry into treatment of suspected 
terrorists, the British government also provided monetary compensation to Binyam Mohammed 
and others. See Burns & Cowell supra note 144 (discussing this agreement to pay 
compensation).  
235
 There are, however, certain procedural elements of a well-structured commission of 
inquiry that should occur long before any consideration of monetary redress and compensation. 
These procedures in themselves constitute a certain level of redress. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT’L, 
TRUTH, JUSTICE AND REPARATION: ESTABLISHING AN EFFECTIVE TRUTH COMMISSION 37 
(2007), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/POL30/009/2007/en/77ee33de-
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The successes of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and 
Internment of Civilians and the Arar Commission provide support to 
the proposition that a commission to investigate the extraordinary 
rendition program and consider compensation for victims is necessary 
and appropriate. Congress has the power to conduct investigations,236 
and should use this power to establish a commission to investigate 
abuse claims by victims of extraordinary rendition. What, then, are 
the necessary characteristics of such a commission? Morgane Landel 
provides several important preliminary suggestions.237 A central 
theme to Landel’s proposal is that the commission be victim centered; 
that is, that victims have the opportunity to openly and honestly 
testify; that the commissioners themselves, in the interest of fairness 
to the victims, represent national and international entities; and that 
the commission have the capacity to fully understand the background 
of the victims’ claims through subpoena of sensitive documents.238 
Additionally, Landel emphasizes the need for the commission to be 
open and transparent through public hearings.239 
In principle, Landel’s propositions establish a solid framework for 
a commission to investigate extraordinary rendition claims. The 
CWRIC and the Arar Commission certainly reflect Landel’s emphasis 
on public inquiry.240 But one must ultimately consider the recent 
                                                                                                                 
 
d38a-11dd-a329-2f46302a8cc6/pol300092007en.pdf (discussing the importance of establishing 
such a commission so that it has the power to make recommendations to the national 
government and widely publish its findings to the general public); James L. Gibson, On 
Legitimacy Theory and the Effectiveness of Truth Commissions, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
Winter 2009, at 123, 139 (“The most pressing task of a truth commission is to establish 
legitimacy with the members of a society. Legitimacy typically requires fair and reasonably 
transparent procedures.”).  
236
 See Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 498 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring) 
(“Congress unquestionably has . . . broad authority to investigate, to inform the public, and, 
ultimately, to legislate against suspected corruption and abuse of power in the Executive 
Branch.”); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957) (“The power of the Congress to 
conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative process.”). 
237
 See Morgane Landel, Proposals for a Truth Commission and Reparations Program for 
Victims of Torture by US Forces Since 9/11, 16 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 115, 117 (2009) 
(proposing a truth commission to conduct inquiry into the detention of suspected terrorists and 
their treatment by U.S. officials).  
238
 See id. at 139: 
In order to be victim centered, a truth commission in the United States should . . . 
have a consultation process to ensure that victims are able to participate in setting it 
up, should have an equal number of international and national commissioners and 
should have strong powers to compel disclosure of documents and compel people to 
testify. 
239
 See id. at 128 (arguing that “[t]he commission should also have the power to hold 
hearings in public, at least those taking place in the United States.”) 
240
 See Arar Commission, supra note 149, at 9–10 (discussing the establishment of the Arar 
Commission based on mounting public pressure concerning the role of the Canadian 
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holdings of Arar and Jeppesen, which would seem to represent the 
willingness of the federal courts to uphold the Reynolds privilege in 
the context of extraordinary rendition cases.241 To overcome this 
burden, Congress should establish a commission to investigate abuses 
carried out by the federal government as part of its extraordinary 
rendition program. Congress should grant this commission full access 
to all sensitive materials that would otherwise be excluded from a 
judicial proceeding under either the Totten bar or the Reynolds 
privilege.242 Congress should also explicitly exempt information 
gathered by a commission on extraordinary rendition from the 
Reynolds privilege. To achieve this, Congress may have to require 
that certain commission proceedings be closed to the general public, 
and may have to prohibit the commission from publishing the exact 
bases of its findings and recommendations if those factual findings 
would compromise issues of national security.243 In full accordance 
with jurisprudence on the Reynolds privilege, however, the 
government should still have the burden of asserting the privilege in 
                                                                                                                 
 
government in the detention of Maher Arar); CWRIC, supra note 205, at 1 (describing the 
process and locations of the public hearings and the extent of the evidence that the CWRIC 
gathered).  
241
 See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1090 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011) (mem.) (“[P]artial disclosure of the existence and even some 
aspects of the extraordinary rendition program does not preclude other details from remaining 
state secrets if their disclosure would risk grave harm to national security.”); Arar v. Ashcroft, 
585 F.3d 559, 576 (2d Cir. 2009) (“The sensitivity of . . . classified material are ‘too obvious to 
call for enlarged discussion.’ Even the probing of these matters entails the risk that other 
countries will become less willing to cooperate with the United States in sharing intelligence 
resources to counter terrorism.” (quoting Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529 (1988)).  
242
 The Ninth Circuit in Jeppesen recognized this congressional authority in the context of 
extraordinary renditions and noted that “Congress has the authority to enact remedial legislation 
authorizing appropriate causes of action and procedures to address claims like those presented 
[in Jeppesen].” Jeppesen, 614 F. 3d at 1092; see also id. (quoting Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d 
977, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1982): 
When the state secrets doctrine ‘compels the subordination of appellants’ interest in 
the pursuit of their claims to the executive’s duty to preserve our national security, 
this means that remedies for . . . violations that cannot be proven under existing legal 
standards, if there are to be such remedies, must be provided by Congress.’  
243
 The Arar Commission was also constrained by certain closed proceedings in its 
investigation of the extraordinary rendition of Maher Arar. See Arar Commission, supra note 
149, at 10 (describing the compilation of evidence and witness testimony, and noting that: 
The process was complex because of the need to keep some of the relevant 
information confidential, to protect national security and international relations 
interests. [The Commission] received some of the evidence in closed, or in camera, 
hearings and [is] unable to refer to some of the evidence heard in those hearings in 
the public version of [the] report. 
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order to prevent certain sensitive materials from general public 
access.244 
Of course, this proposal for a commission to investigate the 
extraordinary rendition program contains certain flaws. First, by 
limiting the access of information available to the public, and 
essentially conducting a secret investigation of a secretive 
government program, Congress might decrease the value of an 
investigatory commission.245 Indeed, it would certainly make it more 
difficult to hold the Executive Branch publicly accountable for the 
extraordinary rendition program. Second, unlike the Japanese 
Americans, victims of extraordinary rendition lack a common 
community forum around which to mobilize and coalesce.246 The 
redress movement for victims of extraordinary rendition from within 
the United States would likely be championed not by the victims 
themselves, but rather by various human rights organizations.247 
Finally, the Japanese American redress movement exemplifies the 
painfully slow process through which Congress would realistically 
operate to provide some form of redress—monetary or not—for 
victims of extraordinary rendition.  
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 For a discussion of the Reynolds privilege, see supra Part III.B.  
245
 The Second Circuit in Arar also recognized the shortcomings of secret hearings, and the 
preference for open courts, in refusing to extend a Bivens action to the context of extraordinary 
rendition. See Arar, 585 F.3d at 577 (noting that such “measures would excite suspicion and 
speculation as to the true nature and depth of the supposed conspiracy, and as to the scope and 
depth of judicial oversight”). 
246
 While all victims of extraordinary rendition share the common experience of 
interrogation for alleged participation in terrorist activities, not all victims share the same factual 
experiences. See, e.g., Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1073–75 (summarizing the various ordeals, means 
of detention, and locations of detention that the specific plaintiffs endured). Additionally, many 
victims of extraordinary rendition may be inadmissible to the United States on terrorism and 
national security grounds. See supra, note 88 (listing statutes describing when such victims may 
be inadmissible to the United States).  
247
 See ACLU Asks Supreme Court to Hear Extraordinary Rendition Case, ACLU (Dec. 8, 
2010), http://www.aclu.org/national-security/aclu-asks-supreme-court-hear-extraordinary-
rendition-case (announcing the ACLU’s petition of certiorari to the US Supreme Court to hear 
the Jeppesen case); AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 2, at 11–12 (detailing Amnesty International’s 
specific demands with regard to halting the extraordinary rendition program); US: Torture 
Should Not Go Unpunished, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Nov. 9, 2010), 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/11/09/us-torture-should-not-go-unpunished (arguing that the 
United States has an obligation under domestic and international law to prosecute CIA officials 
who have used harsh interrogation techniques rising to the level of torture). While human rights 
organizations will play a key role in the mobilization of a redress program for victims of 
extraordinary rendition, they may encounter limitations to the extent of their advocacy. See 
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2725 (2010) (holding that statutes 
prohibiting knowingly providing material support to terrorist organizations did not violate 
freedom of speech as applied to organizations and individuals who sought to provide advice and 
support regarding peaceful petition of humanitarian relief before the UN and other 
representative bodies to foreign terrorist organizations).  
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Victims of extraordinary rendition may face another obstacle. 
Unlike the Japanese Americans that the government compensated for 
their treatment during the Second World War, victims of 
extraordinary rendition are primarily not American citizens.248 This 
alone, however, should not hinder efforts to provide them with 
meaningful remedies for two reasons. First, American citizens appear 
to be in no greater position to overcome the state secrets doctrine in 
claims involving their mistreatment at the hands of U.S. officials than 
foreign nationals.249 Second, at least one recent example shows that 
the government has been willing to take preliminary steps to 
investigate grievances by foreign nationals who were victims of 
scientific research in Guatemala in the 1940s.250 
CONCLUSION 
In its recommendations, the Commission on Wartime Relocation 
and Internment of Civilians poignantly reminded Congress, “[n]ations 
that forget or ignore injustices are more likely to repeat them.”251 Ten 
years after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has 
had to address the challenges of eradicating domestic and 
international threats from terrorist organizations. In meeting this 
challenge, however, the United States may have compromised its 
commitment to human rights and the rule of law through the 
extraordinary rendition program. Victims of extraordinary rendition, 
for the moment at least, will likely find no relief in the federal judicial 
system for their legitimate claims of torture and abuse.  
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 Maher Arar is a Canadian citizen. See supra note 86. His compensation by the 
government of Canada is thus similar to the U.S. government’s compensation to Japanese 
Americans. As of the writing of this Note, however, Binyam Mohamed is a legal resident, but 
not a citizen, of the United Kingdom. See supra notes 100–01 and accompanying text.  
249
 As discussed above in Part V.A.2, Vance v. Rumsfeld would have appeared to place 
American citizens on a different footing than their foreign national counterparts and would have 
allowed a claim against the government for claims of abuse by U.S. officials in Iraq; the 
Seventh Circuit, however, recently granted a rehearing en banc and vacated the opinion. See 
Vance v. Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d 591, 622 (7th Cir. 2011) (distinguishing the claims brought by 
U.S. citizens in this case, as opposed to claims brought by foreign nations in Arar and other 
similar cases, and holding that “we should not let the difficulty of [Arar and other extraordinary 
rendition cases] lead us to lose sight of the fundamentally different situation posed by the claims 
of civilian U.S. citizens in this case.”), vacated en banc, No. 101687 (Oct. 28, 2011) (The court 
will set oral argument at a later date.). 
250
 See generally PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, 
‘ETHICALLY IMPOSSIBLE’: STD RESEARCH IN GUATEMALA FROM 1946 TO 1948, at 2–8 (2011), 
available at http://bioethics.gov/cms/sites/default/files/Ethically-Impossible_PCSBI.pdf 
(outlining the work of the commission, which President Barack Obama charged with 
investigating allegations of unethical American scientific research practices in Guatemala in the 
1940’s). 
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 PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED PART 2: RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 218, at 6. 
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This should not, however, preclude social justice advocates from 
calling into question the legal theories that have barred judicial relief. 
More importantly, the past precedent of compensation for Japanese 
Americans illustrates that victims of abuse by the federal government 
may achieve redress outside the judicial system without explicitly 
overturning established legal precedents. While the redress movement 
in the United States for victims of extraordinary rendition may be 
slow, two of our closest allies—Canada and the United Kingdom—
have already commenced the process.  
Victims’ advocates and members of Congress should consider 
these examples and begin to move forward with establishing a 
commission to obtain meaningful redress and compensation for 
victims of extraordinary rendition. In this way, the United States can 
begin to strike the appropriate balance between combating terrorism 
and upholding respect for proper criminal procedures, the rule of law, 
and human rights.  
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